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Executive Summary
In this analysis, we test for potential causal effects of credit ratings on corporate financing
behavior. We start by replicating the analysis of Kisgen (2006). Like him, we find
significantly negative effects on debt financing for firms that are close to moving to another
macro-rating. We are however not able to replicate his findings that also within a micro-
rating, firms that are closer to being up- or downgraded are more prudent with regard to
debt financing.
We then test for other elements that might influence the link between credit ratings and
corporate financing. We find that firms that have a large amount of debt maturing in the
near future issue less debt compared to equity than an average firm would do. This is
potentially in order to obtain better terms when the reissuance of the outstanding debt
takes place.
We also provide concrete estimates for the credit spread change of corporate debt after
up- or downgrades at different rating levels. We find that firms who would face a stronger
credit spread change after an up- or downgrade are more prudent with debt issuance.
This effect is even stronger if we multiply the potential credit spread change with the
total amount of debt outstanding. Even after controlling for the economic impact of a
credit rating change, we find lower net debt issuance for firms close to moving to another
macro-rating. After controlling for overall different levels of debt financing at different
credit ratings, only the border between BB and B remains to show such an abnormal
effect on financing.
In the last part of the analysis, we try to build a model which precisely values the cash
flows implied in a credit rating change. This model does however not lead to a higher
explanatory power, most likely due to unavailable data about firms’ debt maturities after
a five year horizon and the lack of an appropriate discount rate.
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Economic growth in the last two centuries has in particular been driven by large corpora-
tions. One important aspect that distinguishes them from traditional, family-owned firms
is the requirement for capital from outside investors. Depending on which type of capital
they hold, investors have very different interests in a firm. Debt holders are - given the
same amount of return - interested in low bankruptcy risk.
Banks typically have the expertise and resources to carry out extensive analyses and
monitoring, which allows them to observe the bankruptcy risk with reasonable accuracy.
Other debt investors might however not be able to carry out these analyses. An analysis
of debt instruments by to many individual investors can even be economically inefficient
(Berk and DeMarzo, 2011, p. 235). This is where the credit rating industry steps in,
which aims at mitigating the information asymmetry between the managers of a firm
and current or potential debt holders by issuing a formal opinion about the likelihood of
default and the corresponding expected recovered value under bankruptcy.
What does this imply for a firm? In an extreme case, outside investors only rely on credit
ratings and do not perform any fundamental analyses of the issuing firm. Credit ratings
are however no perfect measure of credit risk. One problem is that rating issuers are
typically prudent and revise credit ratings with a lag compared to the real change in the
firm’s fundamentals (Kou and Varotto, 2005).
Another problem is that credit rating agencies use a discrete scale for their ratings. The
three major rating agencies all subdivide the credit strength of firms which did not default
on their credit obligations yet in 8 main categories with in total 20 subcategories (Baker
and Martin, 2011, p. 300). This implies that small changes in credit risk within one of
the 20 subcategories are not observed by outsiders that rely only on credit ratings.
This might change the capital structure incentives of a firm. While the cost of a firm
of reducing marginally its outstanding debt is mostly continuous (for example due to a
reduction of the obtained tax shield), the benefits will only discretely materialize when
changing credit ratings. This distorts financing decisions compared to a perfect world
where all information is shared between all agents.
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That many firms do make credit rating considerations is known. For example, in a 2001
survey of 392 CEOs of Fortune 500 companies by Graham and Harvey, 57.1% stated that
credit ratings are an important or very important factor that affect the choice of their
firm’s debt level. The first academic analysis to empirically test the influence of credit
ratings on capital structure was Kisgen (2006), who analyzes in particular the behavior
of firms which are located on the edges of credit ratings and finds that their behavior
deviates from what one would expect without credit ratings.
His analysis focuses in particular on plus- and minus ratings, which refer to ratings that
contain a plus (e.g. AA+) or a minus (e.g. AA-), respectively. He argues that due to
the mentioned discrepancy between discrete benefits and continuous costs of changing
credit ratings, firms with a plus-rating will reduce their debt issuance in order to obtain
a relatively cheap upgrade, which will bring larger benefits in terms of financing costs.
Likewise will a minus-rated firm reduce its debt issuance, in order to avoid the large
discrete increases in financing costs from being downgraded. In his analysis, he does
indeed find significantly negative debt issuance behaviors at plus and minus ratings, as
well as for firms which inside their specific rating are located close to an up- or downgrade.
Other papers have tried to replicate Kisgen’s analysis and taken into account other factors
that might influence the relationship between credit ratings and capital structure. For
example, Kemper and Rao (2013) expand the sample to find several points that make
them conclude that the effect of credit ratings on capital structure is not as strong as
Kisgen claimed. One point among others is that they find that the effect is not stronger
for firms with higher external financing needs, although these should be the ones that are
more subject to effects of credit ratings due to their larger amounts of outstanding debt.
Drobetz and Heller (2014) extend Kisgen’s analysis to German firms and find ambiguous
results. While replicating Kisgen’s analysis on their new sample leads to similar results,
the reaction of firms to changes in credit ratings suggests that only the financing behavior
of low-rated firms is strongly influenced by credit ratings.
In this analysis, we will carry out a study based on the approach of Kisgen (2006). After
introducing our sample and methodology, we will try to replicate the findings of Kisgen on
a dataset covering a longer time span. Afterwards, we will consider other aspects which
should have an influence on the relationship between credit ratings and capital structure
which were not included in Kisgen’s study, specifically the term structure of outstanding





Similarly to Kisgen’s analysis, we will use company data from the Compustat database.
It is operated by Standard & Poor’s, but is in this case accessed through the Wharton
Research Data Services from the Wharton School, which is the business school of the
University of Pennsylvania.
All firms for which a credit rating is available are considered. The credit rating used is the
Standard & Poor’s Domestic Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating. The agency itself defines
this rating as a “forward-looking opinion about an obligor’s overall creditworthiness”
(Standard & Poor’s, 2018). This means that the credit rating does not refer to a specific
debt obligation, but rather to the creditworthiness of a firm as a whole.
The earliest available credit ratings in Compustat date back to 1985. After 2017, the
credit rating database has been discontinued. Since in this analysis we will match firm
observations to lagged credit ratings from one year earlier, we are also able to use data
from 2018. Thus, the total sample length ranges for the credit ratings from 1985 to 2017,
and for the firm-fundamental data from 1986 to 2018.
2.2 Sample Selection Choices
As explained in the introduction, a part of the analysis will be carried out using the same
tests as Kisgen (2006). Whenever our analysis yields different results than his study, it
is important to understand why these differences arise. One obvious possibility is that
the differences are due to the longer time horizon of this analysis, which covers data until
2018, while Kisgen’s study’s data stops in 2002. Not only does this study thus use 16
more years, but it also covers the financial crisis of 2008/09, which lead to some structural
changes in the corporate debt and credit rating markets.
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In order to attribute differences from Kisgen’s findings to the longer time span, it is
important that the methodological background is exactly equal. This can be tested by
running the same tests as the author on the same dataset from Compustat, covering the
exact same time span. Kisgen uses data from 1985 to 2002. In 2008, Compustat changed
its data reporting structure, but legacy data following the old format for observations
until 2008 included is available. This can be used to replicate the study of Kisgen, but
does not allow to extend the analysis by more than 6 years.
The replication of Kisgen’s analysis with the legacy data and the same time span should
lead to the same results. However, we encountered difficulties in exactly replicating his
findings. These difficulties may stem from sample composition choices, for example:
• Geographical Composition: Kisgen states that he uses “all firms with a credit
rating in Compustat at the beginning of a particular year” (Kisgen, 2006, p. 1047).
He does not state whether he uses the Compustat North America or the Compustat
Global database, but only the Compustat North American database contains credit
ratings. It is mostly composed of US-American firms, but approximately 8.9% of
observations refer to non-US firms. It is not clear whether Kisgen excludes those
firms since it is not explicitly stated in his paper.
• Debt Ratio Restriction: In the sample summary statistics, Kisgen states that
he excludes observations where the book debt to book debt plus book equity ratio
lies below 0 or above 1. For the analysis afterwards, it is not mentioned whether or
not these observations are taken into account.
• Firm Size Threshold: Kisgen does not explain whether he restricts the firm-
observations in his sample to having a minimum size. This sample choice consists
of several sub-choices: Not only the minimal size has to be established, but also
whether book or market values are used as size measure. Moreover, just the specific
observations of a firm that fall below the threshold could be excluded, or alterna-
tively all observations of a firm that at least once falls below the threshold.
• Other Uncertainties: Kisgen might have carried out other adjustments to the
sample that are not specifically mentioned. An example could be controlling for
extreme outliers, for example through winsorization.
All these different possibilities can be combined to numerous possible sets of choices, which
strongly influence the obtained results. In order to test whether we are able to exactly
replicated Kisgen’s findings, we first decide on 448 possible and reasonable combinations
of the above choices. Then, we automatically compute test results, following as close as
possible the methodology described by the author, and compare the results to his findings.
We compute two different scores: One merely based on significance, where we count
how many coefficients given the sample choices are obtained with the same sign and
significance. For example, a coefficient counts as correct if it is significantly positive in
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both Kisgen’s paper and our test case, while it does not count as correct if it is significantly
positive in the paper but insignificant or significantly negative in our case.
A second sore takes into account also the accuracy of the coefficient: For values where
the significance is correct, the closeness to the value from the paper is computed, where
100% means that the value is equal to the one from paper. When the obtained coefficient
is lower than the one from the paper, we take as score the obtained coefficient divided by
the original value. If the obtained coefficient is higher, we use the inverse of the fraction,
in order to make sure that a higher accuracy score always implies a coefficient closer to
the original value. The formal definition of our accuracy score is thus










1, if β̂ = βK
β̂
βK
, if β̂ < βK
βK
β̂
, if β̂ > βK
(2.1)
where βK is a coefficient obtained by Kisgen and β̂ is a coefficient obtained by us. Since
the accuracy score is set equal to zero when the significance of our finding and Kisgen’s
value are different, the accuracy score has to be always equal or lower than the significance
score.
Only American Min Market Min Book Exclude Significance Accuracy
Data Cap Size All
Yes - $50m Yes 66.2% 54.8%
Yes - $50m No 66.1% 56.9%
Yes $10m - No 65.8% 55.6%
No - $50m - 65.3% 53.9%
Table 2.1: Extract of the characteristics of the best-scoring replication cases of Kisgen (2006)
Table 2.1 shows the four best-scoring paper replication cases. Even in the best-fitting
case, we obtain only roughly two thirds of the coefficients with the same significance as in
Kisgen’s paper. Among other choices, in this case, firms where the book value of assets
falls at least once below $50m are completely removed from the sample. Moreover, only
US-American data is used and no data is winsorized.
It should however still be noted that even with the best-performing approach, we are not
able to replicate at least the same significance of more than two thirds of Kisgen’s obtained
regression coefficients. When making our own sample selection choices, we therefore orient
ourselves on what we found to be close to Kisgen’s approach during the replication test,
but also rely on which choices seem the most reasonable ones.
Among our choices is that we limit our analysis to only American firms. As shown before,
the usable sample size is only reduced by 8.9%, but we avoid problems due to structurally
different debt markets in different countries. Moreover, there is no need for currency
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conversion when relying only on US-American data. In addition, we exclude firms with
negative book equity values from the analysis.
With regard to the size threshold, we decide to exclude firm-observations with a market
capitalization below $10m, since capital issuances of smaller firms will strongly depend
on the possibility to access capital markets and the involved transaction costs. However,
only the specific observations that fall beneath the size threshold are excluded, while other
observations of the same firm that exceed the barrier are maintained. This is important in
order to ensure that there are no biases in the sample that evolve from a certain company
growth pattern being excluded.
2.3 Econometrical Approach
The basic empirical design of this study follows what is used by Kisgen (2006). He argues
that the discrete changes in financing costs that firms are subject to when passing from
one credit rating to another lead firms to adjust their financing behavior. In order to
test this, he looks at the net debt issuance of firms in a specific year. He defines it
as the net issuance of debt minus the net issuance of equity. This net debt issuance is
expressed relatively to firm size, hence it is divided by the total assets of the firm before
the beginning of the year.
The exact Compustat fields used in this analysis can be found in Appendix B. With
these, the net debt issuance is formally computed as:
∆NetDebti,t = ((DLTISi,t −DLTRi,t +DLCCHi,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net Debt Issuance







It is important to consider the net debt issuance instead of the “pure” debt issuance,
because in terms of credit risk, the two capital issuances have opposite effects. While
additional debt issuances generally speaking put the outstanding debt more at risk, equity
issuance reduce the risk because of the higher capital available and the lower priority of
equity under bankruptcy. Thus, in terms of credit risk, the effect of a debt issuance can be
offset with a sufficiently large issuance of equity. For this analysis, it is however important
to understand how firms adjust their financing behavior in terms of implied credit risk,
which is the connection between capital structure and credit ratings.
Varying variables are used as dependent variables in order to try to explain the firms’
financing decisions. The explanatory variables will typically be supplemented with a set
of three control variables, which are supposed to control for structural differences between
firms that affect their financing behavior. These are the leverage of a firm (defined as
the outstanding debt divided by outstanding debt plus outstanding equity), the earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization relative to the total assets of a firm
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and finally the natural logarithm of total sales as a proxy for a firm’s size. We decided to
use the natural logarithm of sales in our analysis in order to have results comparable to
Kisgen (2006). However, our results are robust to using assets instead of sales as proxy for
firm size, independently of whether the absolute value or the logarithm is considered. For
the sake of readability, the control variables will be aggregated to the vector Ki,t when





The final sample that satisfies all requirements consists of 31 070 observations of 3 727
firms. This means that on average there are 8.3 yearly observations of each firm in the
sample. 565 firms have only one observation available, while 41 firms are featured over
the whole length of the 32 year sample period.
As explained, in this analysis we will focus on the net debt issuance of firms. In order
to put this in perspective, it is useful to first look at the overall leverage of the firms in
the sample. Leverage will be defined by the amount of outstanding book debt divided by
outstanding book debt plus outstanding book equity. The average degree of leverage by


























































C C D SD
Figure 3.1: Mean leverage (blue line) defined as book D/(D + E), and number of
observations (gray bars) by credit rating. Numeric results in Table A.1 on page 55.
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It can be seen that the mean leverage increases from sightly over 30% for AAA-rated
firms up until over 60% at CCC ratings. Surprisingly, leverage decreases for ratings lower
than CCC. This is most likely due to a more difficult access to debt financing markets due
to a high bankruptcy risk or already running bankruptcy processes. Standard & Poor’s
states for example in its definition of the CC rating that it “expects default to be a virtual
certainty” (Standard & Poor’s, 2018), which explains why these companies struggle to
issue debt.
It should also be noted that the amount of observations available (shown by the gray
bars) is very low for ratings below B. This means that average statistics by single ratings
for these low-rated firms are very vulnerable to single-firm outliers. Finally, there might
be other mechanisms influencing the sample of low-rated firms. For example, given the
large amount of bankruptcy cases in these rating regions, the sample could be biased due
to the fact that it only contains “surviving” companies, which might have a lower amount
of outstanding debt than a normal low-rated firm.
With this in mind, the next step is to start looking at the firms’ financing behavior. As
explained in section 2.3, the analysis focuses on changes in capital structure. A change
in debt is thus defined as debt issuance minus debt reduction, and similarly for equity.























































C C D SD
Figure 3.2: Debt issuance (red dashed), equity issuance (green dashed) and net debt
issuance (blue) by credit rating. Numeric results in Table A.2 on page 56.
The dashed red line shows the debt change of a firm relative to its outstanding assets.
From AAA to B, it is roughly constant, but decreases sharply for firms with lower ratings.
This is in line with the earlier claim that the decrease in leverage for low-rated firms might
be due to difficulties in accessing corporate debt markets, since these firms do indeed also
issue much less debt.
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The equity change is depicted by the green dashed line. It increases from nearly −3% to
over +4% for CCC-rated firms and decreases afterwards again. Thus, firms with credit
ratings over BB do reduce their outstanding equity on average. The fact that lower-rated
firms tend to issue more equity than higher-rated firms might also be influenced by the
earlier mentioned potential survivorship effects: In order to avoid bankruptcy (which
would make the firms drop out of our sample), additional equity might be issued in order
to cover the debt holders’ claims, coming for example from missing interest payments.
This would then explain why the leverage ratio of low-rated firms decreases.
In Equation 2.2, we defined the difference between the debt and the equity issuance as
net debt issuance, which will be investigated in this analysis. It is depicted by the solid
blue line in the diagram. It decreases slightly between AAA and BB and plummets
afterwards. Kisgen (2006) shows a similar diagram, in which he finds that firms with a
plus or minus rating issue less net debt than firms with a sign-less rating. He argues that
this is evidence of a modified financing behavior because of credit ratings. We cannot
visually find a similar pattern here.
3.2 Plus or Minus Test
3.2.1 Aggregated
First, we test whether firms on the edge of being up- or downgraded to the next macro-
rating change their financing behavior. With macro-ratings, we refer to the letter part
of a credit rating, hence ignoring pluses or minuses. For example, the macro-rating AA
coves the micro-ratings AA+, AA and AA-.
As already explained, the analysis is based on the assumption that there are discrete
effects on a firm when changing macro-rating, which potentially weigh so strongly on a
firm that it adjusts its financing behavior. This is because the benefit from moving to the
next-higher macro-rating is claimed to be relatively high compared to the costs associated
with reducing the net debt issuance slightly. Similarly, Kisgen (2006) claims that firms
with a minus-rating fear to be downgraded to the next-lower macro-rating, since this is
also connected to large costs. Firms with a plus or minus rating are thus expected to
issue less net debt than firms with a sign-free rating in the middle of a macro-rating.
Whether a firm has a plus or minus in its credit rating will be captured with dummy
variables: CRPOM is set equal to 1 when the credit rating includes a plus or a minus,
while CRPlus and CRMinus equal 1 only when the rating features a plus and minus,
respectively.
Both the effect of a credit rating with plus or minus as well as with distinct plus and minus
dummy variables is tested with corresponding models. The earlier introduced control
variables are included as well in order to control for confounding effects. In addition,
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we will also compute the first regression without control variables. From this follows the
definition of three regression equations:
∆NetDebti,t = α+ βCRPOM + φKi,t + εi,t (3.1)
∆NetDebti,t = α+ β1CRPlus + β2CRMinus + φKi,t + εi,t (3.2)
∆NetDebti,t = α+ βCRPOM + εi,t (3.3)
The regression results are summarized in Table 3.1. At first, the regression is carried out
on the entire sample for which the fields required for the computation are available. It
is striking that no significant effect of the credit rating sign on financing behavior can
be found, neither for aggregate plus and minus variables nor for separate plus and minus
variables. Kisgen (2006) argues that this is because when issuing very large amounts of
debt, any firm will experience a downgrade to the next macro-rating, no matter where
in its macro-rating the firm is located. Therefore, the position of the firm in the macro-
rating, approximated by the plus and/or minus variable, is less relevant.
Full Sample Excluding Large Excluding Large Debt
Debt Offerings And Equity Offerings
CRPOM −0.0015 −0.0027∗∗ −0.0031∗∗∗
with controls (0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0009)
CRPOM −0.0023 −0.0053∗∗∗ −0.0051∗∗∗
w/o controls (0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0010)
CRPlus −0.0013 −0.0017 −0.0014
(0.0021) (0.0014) (0.0011)
CRMinus −0.0017 −0.0037∗∗∗ −0.0049∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0013) (0.0011)
Table 3.1: Summary of regression results of plus or minus test. Dependent variable: net debt
issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Complete
results in Table A.3 on page 57 (unrestricted sample) and Table A.4 on page 57 (restricted
sample).
However, it should be considered that a downgrade is not a binomial event. Instead,
a firm could be downgraded by just one rating step or by multiple, and the effect of a
downgrade is likely to be more significant when a firm jumps several rating steps. A firm
located at a minus-rating might therefore fear that it will be downgraded several macro-
ratings. Similarly, a firm with a plus-rating might have the chance to be upgraded over
several macro-ratings when reducing its net debt issuance. These effects could potentially
explain why the coefficients found on the plus and/or minus variables are all negative,
even though none of these are significant at a 10% confidence level. We can however not
exclude that these negative but insignificant coefficients are not due to other unknown
mechanisms.
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In order to overcome the issue of potentially very large capital offerings, Kisgen limits the
sample to firm-year observations where the total debt issuance does not exceed 10% of
total assets, as well as a setting where neither the debt nor the equity issuances account
for more than 10% of total assets. The exclusion of large debt offerings reduces the sample
size by approximately one third from 31 070 to 20 953. This also has a subtle effect on
the composition of the sample: Tendentially, smaller firms seem to make more larger
debt issuances compared to firm size. This is shown by a correlation coefficient of total
assets with debt issuances divided by total assets of −5.0% and debt issuances to market
capitalization of −6.9%. In fact, the average market capitalization in the entire sample is
$10.8b, while it is $12.7b when omitting large debt offerings.
The exclusion of equity offerings exceeding 10% of total assets concerns fewer firms in the
sample, precisely 1 085. Also here the excluded firms are on average smaller, but the effect
is less strong than for the exclusion based on debt issuances. Combining the debt and
equity exclusion leads to a sample size of 20 562, which is 391 less than when excluding
only large debt issuances.
With regard to the regression results, the exclusion of large debt offerings leads to the
combined plus or minus dummy variable being significantly negative, both when including
or excluding the control variables. This seems to indicate that when a firm is closer to
changing its macro-rating, it reduces its net debt issuance. When looking at the separate
plus and minus variables, only the minus one is significantly negative, showing that the
effect of a minus rating is likely to be what drives the combined variable to be significantly
negative.
It seems that firms on the lower bound of macro-ratings are concerned about being down-
graded and thus adjust their financing behavior, while firms closer to an upgrade to the
next macro-rating perceive the potential upgrade to be less valuable. The stronger ef-
fect at minus-ratings could for example be because many debt contracts require a firm to
maintain a minimum credit rating (Mittoo and Zhang, 2010, p. 585). Hence, being down-
graded to a credit rating below what has to be maintained by the firm is connected to
high costs, while achieving an upgrade might not have such discrete changes in financing
costs.
Another aspect that has to be considered is that the size of the impact of a credit rating
change on a firm’s financing behavior depends on the amount of outstanding debt. The
more outstanding debt a firm has, the more important it is for the firm to signal a low
credit default risk to outsiders. A firm should thus be particularly careful about issuing
more debt and being downgraded, because the negative effect of having a lower credit
rating is enforced by the higher amount of debt. On the other hand, if a firm issues
less debt in order to obtain an upgrade, the beneficial effect of a higher credit rating
is dampened by the lower amount of outstanding debt. This could explain why the
results suggest that firms are careful about being downgraded, but less influenced in their
financing behavior when they are close to an upgrade.
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When excluding also large equity offerings, the results obtained from the regression models
are the same in terms of significances and also similar in terms of magnitude. This is in
line with the earlier explanation that the sample composition does not significantly change
when excluding also equity offerings, since these occur less frequently. In addition, roughly
two thirds of the large equity offerings have already been excluded when excluding large
debt offerings.
Kisgen (2006) runs the same test, but on his sample that ends in 2002. He obtains signif-
icantly negative coefficients on all credit rating dummy variables, so unlike our findings
also on the plus rating variable. One reason why his findings on the smaller sample de-
viate from our findings with data until 2018 could be because of structural changes as a
consequence of financial crises. In Figure 3.3, the annual percentage of up- and down-
grades compared to the total credit ratings of Standard & Poor’s is shown. Two periods
stand out: A large amount of downgrades during the Dot-com crash from 2000 to 2002
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Figure 3.3: Annual percentage of credit rating upgrades (green) and downgrades (red)
compared to total Standard & Poor’s credit ratings. Data from Standard & Poor’s
(2019)
Kisgen’s dataset stops in 2002, at the end of the Dot-com crash. Due to the large amount
of downgrades during the two crises, firms might have anticipated a higher likelihood of
downgrades than upgrades after the crises, even though the diagram shows that between
the crises, the balance between up- and downgrades was not more unfavorable than be-
fore the Dot-com bubble. This could have lead firms to react less strongly to a potential
upgrade, which could explain the difference between Kisgen’s findings and ours. In addi-




In order to being able to clearly interpret the obtained coefficients, it is important to
understand what is driving these. In case of this credit rating test, it is thus important
to understand whether the significantly negative coefficients are driven by the entire
sample or rather by some specific credit rating groups. This is tested here by running
the regression on samples restricted to the different macro-ratings. The test is run for all
macro-ratings from AA to CCC, since AAA and ratings lower than CCC have a sample
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Figure 3.4: Coefficients on CRPOM (blue), CRPlus (green dashed) and CRMinus
(orange dashed) by macro rating. Rhombuses indicate significance at 5% significance
level. Numeric results in Table A.5 on page 58.
The results of this test can be graphically seen in Figure 3.4. The blue line, which illus-
trates the coefficient on the combined plus or minus dummy variable, is only significantly
negative at the B macro-rating, while it is not significantly different from zero otherwise.
The plus rating coefficient is larger than the combined one for all ratings between A and
B, while the minus coefficient is lower than the combined one in the same rating range.
This seems to explain why the combined coefficient levels out around zero. At B, all
three coefficients are lower than at higher ratings, which also makes the combined plus or
minus variable significantly negative. At CCC, all three increase again, exceeding by far
the values reached at higher ratings.
To get a better understanding of the behavior at different macro-ratings, it is also useful
to look at the overall net debt issuance pattern at different macro-ratings. In Figure 3.5,
the intercepts of the plus or minus regressions for the different macro-ratings are shown.
It can be seen that even after controlling for the effects of a plus or minus credit rating,
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Figure 3.5: Intercepts of macro-rating plus or minus regressions with combined plus or
minus variables (blue) and separate plus and minus variables (green). Numeric results
in Table A.5 on page 58.
behavior at B or CCC ratings, which are the ones where the coefficients on the plus or
minus dummy variables deviated significantly from the results for higher ratings.
At this point, it is therefore not clear why the B and CCC ratings show such different
credit rating effects than higher ratings. Both ratings are not neighboring the investment-
grade border, which is located between BBB- and BB+. We will discuss the border more
in detail in section 3.5.
3.3 Credit Score Test
3.3.1 Aggregated
The analysis of a plus or minus rating on a firm’s financing behavior is based on the
assumption that a rating change from one macro-rating to another is associated with a
stronger impact on a firm’s financing costs. However, such a discrete change in financing
costs can also be expected to take place at any credit rating change, which lies in the nature
of credit ratings. As explained earlier, credit ratings have the function to allow potential
investors to get a quick opinion about the expected credit risk of a bond without having
to perform costly analyses and monitoring. The mere relying on credit ratings however
implies that an outsider will not notice credit risk changes within the same credit rating.
Consequently, a firm that finds itself at the lower edge of a credit rating will try to
maintain the current rating, since most likely the negative effect from being subject to
a downgrade would exceed the positive benefits from issuing slightly more debt. This
is because outsiders that rely entirely on credit ratings cannot distinguish between firms
within the same micro-rating. As Kisgen (2006) states it, outsiders “pool” all firms within
the same rating.
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The opposite effect compared to being located in the lowest part of a micro-rating applies
for a firm which is at the upper edge of a credit rating: With a relatively low amount of
effort, the firm will be able to obtain an upgrade. The benefit of being pooled with the
higher rating firms is likely to outweigh the cost of making the own debt slightly safer,
for example through debt reductions.
To test whether this hypothesis can be confirmed in the data is more difficult, since
we cannot easily observe which firms inside a credit rating are closer to being up- or
downgraded than others. Kisgen (2006) uses a credit score model, where he firsts assigns
to all firms a numerical rating, based on the credit rating obtained by Standard & Poor’s.
A AA+ rating corresponds to the numerical rating 18, while CCC- corresponds to 1.
In a second step, observable financial variables are regressed on the numerical equivalent
of the firms’ credit ratings, in order to understand what seems to drive credit ratings.
Kisgen starts with a broad model including seven financial indicators and then iteratively
drops variables until only significant ones remain. This results in a model where the credit
score of a firm is explained by the natural logarithm of its assets, the EBITDA relative
to its assets as well as the outstanding debt relative to the total capitalization.
From our sample, we compute our credit score model following the same procedure as
Kisgen, which is:
CreditScore = 1.620 + 2.411 log(A) + 7.125EBITDA/A− 2.487Debt/TotalCap. (3.4)
The coefficients in our credit score model are different from the ones computed by Kisgen.
However, the signs in the equation are equal. We further proceed with our own credit
score model. Performing the analysis based on the same credit score equation as Kisgen
leads however to similar results.
Using Equation 3.4, a credit score for each firm can be computed. Then, firms are sorted
by their credit score within their micro-rating. The dummy variable CRHigh will then be
1 for firms within the highest third of credit scores within their rating, while CRLow is
1 for firms in the lowest third. Similarly to the plus or minus test, the dummy variable
CRPOM will be 1 if a firm is in the highest or the lowest third.
With these new variables, a credit rating test similar to the one from the plus or minus
test can be carried out. The corresponding regression equations are thus:
∆NetDebti,t = α+ βCRHOL + φKi,t + εi,t (3.5)
∆NetDebti,t = α+ β1CRHigh + β2CRLow + φKi,t + εi,t (3.6)
∆NetDebti,t = α+ βCRHOL + εi,t (3.7)
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A summary of the estimated coefficients on the credit score dummy variables can be seen
in Table 3.2. When carrying out the regressions on the unrestricted sample, none of the
explanatory variables of interest are significantly different from zero, which is similar to
the plus or minus test. The reason for this was that when large capital offerings take place,
firms will be subject to a macro-rating change no matter where in their macro-rating they
are located. In order to observe differences depending on where inside a micro-rating a
firm is located, we have to again exclude large capital offerings from the sample.
Full Sample Excluding Debt Excluding Debt Excluding Debt &
Offerings > 10% Offerings > 5% Equity Offerings
CRHOL −0.0020 0.0001 0.0006 −0.0019∗
with controls (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0010)
CRHOL −0.0027 −0.0001 0.0007 −0.0021∗
w/o controls (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0011)
CRHigh −0.0031 −0.0076∗∗∗ −0.0061∗∗∗ −0.0048∗∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0013)
CRLow −0.0009 0.0080∗∗∗ 0.0074∗∗∗ 0.0012
(0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0014)
Table 3.2: Summary of regression results of high or low test. Dependent variable: net debt
issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Complete
results in Table A.6 on page 59 (unrestricted sample), Table A.7 on page 59 (excluding debt
offerings) and Table A.8 on page 60 (excluding debt and equity offerings).
An important difference between this test and the plus or minus test is that here, we
exploit differences between micro-ratings instead of macro-ratings. Again, we have to
exclude large capital offerings so that a firm does not change its rating after an offerings
independently from where within it it is located. But now, the size threshold is much
smaller, since we look at micro-ratings, which are by definition only one third as “wide”
as macro-ratings. Therefore, Kisgen (2006) suggests to exclude not only debt offerings
exceeding 10% of total assets as in the plus or minus test, but also those exceeding 5%.
The regression results obtained when excluding debt offerings over 10% of total assets
compared to excluding at 5% are similar in terms of significances and close in terms of
size. The combined high and low variable is found to be insignificant, which seems to be
due to the fact that the high variable is significantly negative, while the low variable is
significantly positive.
The significantly negative coefficients for the high variable confirms what we have ex-
pected, since following the reasoning a firm close to being upgraded might be willing to
take the small extra effort in order to benefiting from the higher credit rating. However,
it seems surprising that the findings suggest that a firm close to being downgraded issues
significantly more debt, which would put the firm at an even higher risk of obtaining the
lower credit rating.
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The significantly positive coefficient on the low credit score had not been found by Kisgen.
We were not able to replicate his result, even after limiting the sample to the same time
span as he has and following closely what the replication test from section 2.2 had shown
to yield the closest results to his. Moreover, we tried to construct the credit scores both
from the model we obtained in Equation 3.4 as well as the credit score model reported in
his paper. We can therefore not conclude that the difference between our results and his
results are due to structural changes after his sample end in 2002, for example due to the
financial crisis.
Unlike Kisgen, we also construct a sample where debt and equity offerings larger than
10% of total assets are excluded, in order to compute results given the same restrictions
as in the plus or minus test. By doing so, the sample size is reduced by only roughly
2% comparing to excluding only debt offerings larger than 10% of total assets, because
large equity offerings are much less frequent than large debt offerings. Furthermore, large
equity offerings that occur in the same year as large debt offerings have already been
removed when large debt offerings were removed.
Unlike the samples where only large debt offerings where excluded, the combined high or
low credit score variable is now significantly negative, which indicates that firms closer
to being up- or downgraded are more prudent when issuing net debt. The earlier result
that firms at the lower end of a credit rating issue significantly more net debt is also not
found again, since the coefficient now results insignificant.
It might seem counter-intuitive that the net debt issuance decreases after excluding large
equity offerings, since large equity offerings reduce the net debt issuance. However, it has
to be considered that the intercept is higher after excluding large equity offerings, which
implies that firms overall issue more net debt after excluding large equity offerings, which






Figure 3.6: Change of net debt issuance (sum of high or low variables and intercept)
from sample excluding only large debt offerings (lower blue line) to sample excluding
both large debt and equity offerings (upper green line).
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In order to understand better what the change in coefficients based on the sample spec-
ification implies, it is beneficial to make use of a visualization. In Figure 3.6, net debt
issuance at high, middle and low credit rating thirds is shown. The blue line on the
bottom refers to the sample where only large debt offerings are excluded, while the green
line shows the sample which excludes also large equity offerings.
We consider here the sum of the intercept plus the high or low coefficients, since this
allows us to see what effect the exclusion of large equity offerings has from the sample.
In fact, we see that the net debt issuance increases for all three thirds when excluding
also large equity offerings. This makes sense, since equity offerings reduce the net debt
issuance.
The effect of the sample restriction on the high or middle third credit score thirds is
relatively similar. This can be seen on the dashed lines, which allow to compare the high
and low thirds with the middle one. The distance between the high value and the dashed
line does not change by much between the two sample specifications. On the low third
credit ratings, the effect of the sample restriction is much smaller, as can be seen by the
difference between the two values shown by the light green area, which is thinner at the
low credit third. Large equity offerings seem to be less prominent for firms which have
a low position in their credit rating and are hence close to being downgraded. This is
exactly against the intuition, since one would expect that those firms are more worried
about being downgraded and thus have a stronger preference for equity rather than debt
offerings compared to firms positioned higher in their credit rating. This shows again
that our results from the credit score test are not in line with what Kisgen (2006) has
first hypothesized and then empirically found.
3.3.2 By Macro-Rating
Similarly to the plus and minus test, it is also for the credit score test beneficial to
understand whether the found effect on the financing behavior is caused by all credit
ratings in the same way, or rather heterogeneously from just some macro-ratings. In
order to test this, the sample is again subdivided into subsamples based on the different
macro-ratings and the regressions are carried out on these. The regression results are
graphically presented in Figure 3.7 on page 25.
It can be seen that the results are very different depending on which macro-rating is
considered. The coefficients on high credit scores are shown by the green dashed line. At
AA, firms seem to issue less net debt when they are close to being upgraded. At A and
BBB, the effect is the opposite: Firms which are close to being upgraded issue actually
more net debt, which in practice reduces their chance of obtaining an upgrade.
For firms in the lowest credit score third (shown by the red dashed line), the found
coefficients move in the opposite direction. At A and BBB, firms issue significantly
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Figure 3.7: Coefficients on CRHOL (blue), CRHigh (green dashed) and CRLow (orange
dashed) by macro rating. Rhombuses indicate significance at 10% significance level.
Numeric results in Table A.5 on page 58.
significantly more net debt. Also here, our results deviate from the ones from Kisgen,
who found all credit score third coefficients for the different macro-ratings to be either
insignificant or significantly negative.
3.4 Interaction of POM and HOL
As explained earlier, the plus or minus test is based on the assumption that there is
a discrete change in financing costs that a firm incurs when moving from one macro-
rating to another, while the high or low test exploits potential discrete changes between
micro-ratings.
If firms really take these changes into account and adjust financing behavior accordingly,
they should be especially careful about financing when being very close to an upgrade to
the next macro-rating. This applies especially to firms which have a plus rating and are
in the highest third of their micro-rating. Similarly, firms in the lowest third of a minus
rating should also be particularly careful, since they seem to be positioned on the edge of
a downgrade to the next macro-rating level.
Contrarily, firms in the lowest third of a plus rating and in the highest third of a minus
rating should be less concerned about financing than the earlier mentioned ones, since for
them a credit rating change would only imply a micro-rating change, which is expected
to have a smaller impact on financing costs than a macro-rating change.
Whether there really is a difference in financing behavior between these types of situations
can easily be tested in the data with the usual framework. Interaction terms between the
plus and/or minus variables with the high and/or low variables are introduced in the
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regression equations. Hence, we also compute now coefficients for firms in the highest
third of plus rating, in the lowest third of a plus rating, in the highest third of minus
rating and in the lowest third of a minus rating.
With controls Without controls
CRHOL CRHigh CRLow CRHOL CRHigh CRLow
CRPOM 0.0017 0.0006
(0.0028) (0.0029)
CRPlus 0.0060 0.0024 0.0034 0.0037
(0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0034) (0.0037)
CRMinus −0.0010 0.0006 −0.0042 −0.0010
(0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0039)
Table 3.3: Summary of regression results of interaction test with plus or minus variables and
high or low variables. Dependent variable: net debt issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Complete results in Table A.9 on page 61.
As before, we compute regression results with and without control variables on a sample
that excludes debt offerings larger than 10% of outstanding assets. The obtained results
are summarized in Table 3.3. It can be seen that none of the interaction terms results
statistically significant. The one which is closest to reaching statistical significance is
the interaction of a plus credit rating with a high third credit score, which accounts
for a p-value of 0.1025. However, this coefficient is close to being significantly positive,
which is against what has been expected beforehand. These results seem to confirm the
earlier finding that the inclusion of the high or low credit score test did not give any new
meaningful insights.
3.5 Investment-Grade Border Test
It could be seen in the macro-rating tests carried out so far that the effects of credit
ratings on financing vary heavily by rating. Hence, it is important to look at differences
between different credit ratings. One border between two macro-ratings stands out from
the others, which is the so-called investment-grade border between BBB- and BB+. Firms
with a credit rating of BBB- or above benefit from a so-called investment-grade credit
rating, while lower ratings are called speculative-grade rating.
The difference between the two rating classes is not a merely quantitative one, indicating
that one simply has a lower default probability than the other. There are also structural
differences. For example, many institutional investors, like pension funds, are subject to a
regulatory framework that does not allow them to invest in speculative-grade bonds (Lan-
gohr and Langohr, 2008). Hence, firms are not only expected to have a lower bankruptcy
risk by outsiders when having at least a BBB- rating, but the firms’ access to financing
as a whole is also facilitated.
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It could thus be expected that firms have a stronger incentive to stay at BBB- instead of
BB+ than staying at the next-higher rating at any other macro-rating border. In order
to test whether this can be found in the data, Kisgen (2006) tests for abnormal net debt
issuances at the investment grade border. The regression setting is the same as used
earlier, however instead of including dummy variables for any plus or minus ratings, just
ratings around the investment-grade border are included in the dummy variable. The
specification is first held narrowly at BBB- and BB+, which are the credit ratings just
around the border. In a second step, the analysis is slightly widened, taking into account
the ratings BBB, BBB-, BB+ and BB, hence accounting for two ratings at each side of
the investment grade border.
It could be though that an eventual negative coefficient on the investment-grade border
dummy variable is simply negative because the corresponding ratings contain a plus or
minus, since it was shown in the plus or minus test in subsection 3.2.1 that a plus or minus
rating generally corresponds to a lower net debt issuance. Therefore, the regressions are
also computed including the combined plus or minus dummy variable from before, which
is supposed to control for generally negative net debt issuance behaviors at plus or minus
ratings. Taking this into account, the regression equations are thus
∆NetDebti,t = α+ βCRIG/SG + φKi,t + εi,t (3.8)
∆NetDebti,t = α+ β1CRIG/SG + β2CRPOM + φKi,t + εi,t, (3.9)
where CRIG/SG corresponds either to the narrow or the wide specification of the invest-
ment grade border ratings.
BBB- and BB+ BBB to BB
SRIG/SG −0.0038∗∗ −0.0028∗ −0.0045∗∗∗ −0.0057∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0012)
CRPOM −0.0021∗ −0.0043∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0012)
Table 3.4: Summary of regression results of investment-grade border test. Dependent variable:
net debt issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Complete results in Table A.10 on page 62.
Table 3.4 summarizes the regression results. The investment-grade border coefficient
always results significantly negative, independently of whether it is specified narrowly or
widely. This also holds when it is controlled for the overall negative net debt issuance
behavior at plus or minus ratings. It seems thus that firms are really more careful about
their debt issuance behavior around the investment-grade border than at other macro-
rating borders.
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Despite the obtained results, it is unclear whether this is a qualitative difference because
of the structural differences mentioned earlier that take place at this border, or whether
the difference is only quantitatively large because of higher financing costs below the
border. In subsection 3.7.4, we will try to test which of these applies.
3.6 Term Structure Tests
3.6.1 Including in Regression
A very well-known capital structure theory is the so-called trade-off theory. Myers (1984)
explains that following the theory, a firm chooses its optimal level of debt by balancing
the positive effects of leverage, in particular the interest tax shield, with the downsides
of leverage, in particular bankruptcy costs. Myers states that after having reached the
optimal debt-equity ratio, there is no incentive anymore for a firm to change its debt level.
If it holds that firms keep their debt level constant, and it is assumed that firms did
already reach their target debt level in the past, then firms will only issue debt each year
at the same amount as the debt that matures in that specific year. By doing so, the
overall outstanding debt is kept constant. This of course holds only if also the amount
of equity is kept constant and there are no other underlying changes in the firm, such
as size and risk of future cash flows. By assuming that this holds, the only issuances of
debt will occur at maturity of the already outstanding debt to replace it. Hence, firms
can perfectly anticipate how large the required debt issuances in the future will be and
when they take place, since the term structure of the own debt is known already before
maturity.
How does this relate to the analysis of credit ratings? This can be understood when
looking at the mechanism through which one would expect that credit ratings influence
a firm’s financing behavior. When the credit rating of a firm changes, a firm is likely to
having to pay a different credit spread afterwards. The credit spread that a firm pays on
already issued debt is instead normally fixed. The credit spread can either be implicit,
for example in zero-coupon bonds through the issuance price, or explicit, for example in
bank loans.
Hence, the credit spread that a firm pays will only change when the debt is re-issued,
unless specific debt covenants are part of the corresponding contracts, which for example
require the involved parties to renegotiate the debt terms. This means that under the
assumptions given earlier, firms with significant amounts of debt maturing soon will be
more concerned about having a high credit rating, since the change in financial cash flows
will occur earlier. Due to discounting, the effect of a rating change will therefore be larger
with more debt maturing soon.
This analysis crucially relies on the assumption that there is actually a causal effect of
credit ratings on the credit spread of a debt instrument. Moreira and Zhao (2018) find
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such a causal relationship. They explain that the effect exists in particular at the issuance
of the debt instrument, and not so much during the subsequent trading phase. This is
sufficient for this analysis, since we do in fact consider the effect of the credit rating at
the issuance of the (refinanced) debt.
It will be tested whether the data confirms that firms with more debt outstanding have a
stronger link between credit ratings and financing behavior. To do so, the amount of debt
maturing in one year, abbreviated as DD1, is introduced as explanatory variable into the
usual regression setting. In order to put the maturing debt level into perspective with
regard to the firm, it is divided by the total outstanding assets. DD1 is not only used as
standalone explanatory variable, but also as interaction term with plus and / or minus as
well as high and / or low dummy variables, since also the effect of a certain credit rating
on financing should depend on the amount of debt maturing soon.
Plus or Minus Test 1 2 3 4
Separate Plus / Minus Yes No Yes No
DD1/A −0.1346∗∗∗ −0.1346∗∗∗ −0.0102∗∗ −0.1022∗∗







High or Low Test 1 2 3 4
Separate High / Low Yes No Yes No
DD1/A −0.1195∗∗∗ −0.1117∗∗∗ −0.1226∗∗ −0.1198∗







Table 3.5: Summary of regression results of term structure test. Dependent variable: net debt
issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Complete
results in Table A.11 on page 63 (Plus or minus test) and Table A.12 on page 64 (High or low
test).
The results of these tests are summarized in Table 3.5. The coefficient found on DD1/A is
significantly negative, indicating that firms tend to reduce their net debt issuance in a year
when they have large amounts of debt maturing in the period afterwards. The interaction
term with a plus or minus rating is however insignificant, which implies that the reduction
takes places at all kinds of ratings, and not just at border to other macro-ratings.
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We also compute the regression in combination with the high or low credit score test, in
order to test for potential different influences of large amounts of debt maturing soon on
current net debt issuances when a firm is close to a micro-rating change. The respective
results are shown in Table A.12 on page 64. Also in this case, the amount of debt
maturing in the next year has a significantly negative coefficient on the current net debt
issuance. The interaction term with the position within the micro-rating is however again
insignificant. This could be because there is simply no influence of whether a firm is close
to a rating change, or because of general difficulties in computing a meaningful credit
score, as already experienced earlier.
The question is now whether the significantly negative coefficient of debt maturing in one
year can really be attributed to a firm’s hope to obtain favorable terms in the subsequent
year. In order to get closer to the answer, we have to look also at alternative possibilities.
One is that debt maturities in firms could simply be “cyclical”, which means that firms
would have years of large debt amounts maturing following years with much lower amounts
reaching maturity. Assuming that firms refinance their debt immediately, this would lead
to a situation where large amounts of debt maturing next year negatively correlate to
debt issuances in the previous year, which could explain the coefficient found.
Whether this is the case can be tested by regressing the amount of debt maturing in a
year on the amount maturing the year afterwards, while controlling for firm fixed effects
and scaling by total assets. The latter one is necessary since different firms have different
levels of debt, which in itself will influence how much debt matures each year. This













The regression results are shown in Table 3.6 on page 31. The coefficient found on the
previous year debt maturing is significantly positive even after controlling for firm-fixed
effects. This rules out the possibility explained before, which implied that the negative
coefficient found on the amount of debt maturing next period on the net debt issuance
in the previous period could simply be a result of negatively correlated debt maturities
in consecutive periods. The finding makes it more likely that the negative effect of debt
maturing next period on the current period’s net debt issuance is really caused by financial
considerations of the respective firm.
Moreover, in order to test the validity of our term structure test, we can look at whether
it really holds that firms issue more debt in years where more debt matures, which is
suggested by our earlier-mentioned immediate-refinancing assumption. To test this, we
can compute a regression similar to the previous one, where we include the amount of
debt issued in a year as dependent variable. We use the one-period lagged amount of
debt maturing, since maturing debt is a forward-looking measure. Therefore, the lagged
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Table 3.6: Regression results of debt maturity autocorrelation test from Equation 3.10.
Dependent variable: DD1t/At.
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
amount of maturing debt in one period and the not-lagged (backward-looking) amount of













As can be seen in the regression results in Table 3.7, the coefficient of debt maturing on
debt issued in the corresponding year is significantly positive. However, after controlling
for firm-fixed effects, the coefficient decreases to 0.0515, implying that if a firm has $100m
of debt maturing in one year, it will on average only issue additional debt worth $5.15m
in that period.






Table 3.7: Regression results of debt issuance and maturity test from Equation 3.11. Dependent
variable: DLTISt/A.
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
The link between debt maturing and new debt issuances is therefore not as direct as
stylized before. One reason could be that firms maybe not always refinance immediately.
When for example debt matures in December, but the refinancing takes place in January,
the operations do not occur in the same year and are thus not captured by the regression.
Moreover, there are many other factors that influence debt issuance behavior, for example
the existence and size of profitable investment opportunities.
Still, there is a positive effect of debt maturing on debt issued. That the relationship is
not 1:1 does not remove the validity from our earlier analysis of the effect of future debt
maturing on present net debt issuance under consideration of the credit rating. Since there
is a positive relationship, firms will on average still account for future debt refinancing
when taking financing decisions, which was confirmed by our earlier analysis. This takes
place even though on average only around 5% of debt is refinanced immediately, because
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still there is a higher expected debt issuance when debt matures and firms can thus be
expected to aim at achieving favorable financing conditions.
3.6.2 Division in Subsamples
Now, an alternative way of controlling for the amount of debt maturing soon is considered.
Instead of including the amount of maturing debt as regression coefficient, the dataset
can be subdivided in two subsamples based on whether the amount of debt maturing
next year divided by total assets is lower or higher than the total sample’s median. By
doing so, separate coefficients on the effect of credit ratings on capital structure can be
computed and interpreted. For the two separate subsamples, the regressions of the plus or
minus test from Equation 3.2 and the high or low test from Equation 3.6 can be estimated
as before.
Plus or Minus Test High or Low Test
DD1/A above median No Yes No Yes
Intercept −0.0692∗∗∗ −0.0998∗∗∗ Intercept −0.1005∗∗∗ −0.1439∗∗∗
(0.0096) (0.0075) (0.0123) (0.0114)
CRPlus −0.0015 −0.0016 CRHigh −0.0051∗∗ −0.0109∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0022)
CRMinus −0.0051∗∗∗ −0.0024 CRLow 0.0081∗∗∗ 0.0124∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0033)
Table 3.8: Summary of regression results of plus or minus and high or low test, where sample is
subdivided firms with lower and higher than median long-term debt maturing in one year
divided by total assets. Dependent variable: net debt issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance
at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Complete results in Table A.13 on page 65.
The respective regression results are summarized in Table 3.8. The plus coefficient does
not substantially change from one to the other subsample, but the minus coefficient is
only half as strong in the subsample with above median debt maturing next period. These
results are in contrast to what one would expect, since firms should care more about their
credit rating when they will have to refinance large amounts of debt soon.
In the high or low test, the coefficient on the high third credit score variable doubles
in magnitude and becomes more strongly negative, which is in line with what would be
expected. However, the low third coefficient, which was already surprisingly positive in
the aggregate dataset, is now approximately 50% larger and thus even more positive.
These findings show that the amount of debt maturing soon seems not to influence how
much firms consider their credit rating when making financing decisions. This is the same
what had already been found before when including the amount of debt maturing in one
year as interaction term with the credit rating dummy variables, which had been found
to be insignificant. However, the earlier test had found a significantly negative effect of
the debt maturing next period on net debt issuance as stand-alone explanatory variable,
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without considering the credit rating. This is also reflected in the subsample test shown
in Table 3.5, since the intercept for firms with above median debt maturing soon is for
both tests significantly lower than for firms below the median.
3.7 Credit Spread Test
3.7.1 Spread Curve Construction
Most of the tests carried out so far treated all credit ratings equally, implying that a
(macro-)credit rating change would have the same impact on a firm, no matter at what
rating. Only the investment-grade border test in section 3.5 focused specifically on the
change from BBB- to BB+ ratings and viceversa. The question remains whether there is
only this qualitative difference due to investment restrictions for speculative-graded firms
and there is thus no difference between the other rating changes.
In this section, we will construct an approximation variable of the economic impact of a
credit rating change, in order to account for potential differences in impact on a firm’s
financing costs at different ratings. We will then test whether this is a significant driver
of financing behavior. We will start by computing the average credit spread that firms at
different credit ratings pay.
The first step that we have to take is computing an implicit interest rate that a firm pays
for every observation in the dataset. This is more difficult than it might seem, since the
paid interest can take many different forms. For example, a classic bank loan will normally
require a periodic interest payment throughout the whole lifetime of the obligation, while
a zero-coupon bond does not pay any interest after its issuance, but its interest arises
“implicitly” from the difference between issuance price and face value.
Without data on the debt structure of the different firms in the sample, it is not possible
to precisely classify and treat all outstanding debt. Since we will only use the implicit
interest as regression variable to test whether it is a significant driver of financing behavior,
the computation of it will be simplified here in order to make it possible given the data
that is available. We will treat all outstanding debt equally for the sake of computing the
implicit interest rate, without considering its type of maturity structure.
We use the Compustat field XINT, which states the total interest incurred by a firm in
a given period. This should be divided by the average outstanding debt of a firm during
the respective year, but this value is not available. We therefore use the arithmetic
average between the outstanding debt before the year and after the year. The field XINT
covers interest both on long-term and short-term interest, so we also divide by the sum
of outstanding long-term and short-term debt. Compustat allows also to extract the
separate long-term debt interest, but the field is only available for a very small sample of
firms, which is not large enough in order to robustly estimate results.
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LongDebtit + LongDebtit−1 + ShortDebtit + ShortDebtit−1
. (3.12)
We now compute a linear regression model on the implicit interest rates with dummy
variables for all credit ratings. We control for year-fixed effects in order to account
for different general interest levels in different years, for example through changes in
government bond rates as base levels for interest computation. Technically, it would
be more correct to compute time-varying rating effects, since not only the risk-free rate
changes over time, but also the specific credit spread by rating. However, this would lead
to a too low sample size for robust coefficient estimation. The respective regression model







γtXt + εi,t (3.13)
The rating AAA is omitted as dummy variable in order to choose it as base level for the
other dummy variable estimates. The other ratings’ coefficients thus reflect the time-fixed
average credit spread relative to AAA. In the following, we only consider ratings of CCC-
and above, since lower ratings have a too low number of observations in order to estimate
reasonable coefficients. The estimated credit spreads are visually shown by the green line



























































Figure 3.8: Raw (green) and smoothed (blue) credit spread curve and number of
observations (gray bars) by micro-rating. Numeric results in Table A.14 on page 66.
What can be seen in the diagram is that the obtained unadjusted credit spread does not
strictly increase by rating. The ratings at which this applies are tendentially the ones
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with a lower amount of observations. The irregular shape of the credit spread curve might
therefore be caused by measurement inaccuracies due to small samples.
For the analysis, it will be important to have a strictly increasing credit spread curve, since
it is assumed that a firm will have to pay a higher credit spread after being downgraded,
not a lower one. We therefore smooth the credit spread curve using a rolling average
which uses the number of observations as weight. We use a width of 3 to both sides,
which in this specific situation seems to provide the best trade-off between large samples
(and thus a smooth and strictly increasing curve) and small enough samples in order
to allow for differences in the slope of the curve, which will be exploited later on. The






Spreadr ∗ nr (3.14)
When there are not three observations available to the side, the spreads taken into account
are reduced accordingly. As an example, the spreads taken into account to compute the
smoothed AA+ spread range from AAA (AA+ plus one) to A+ (AA+ minus three).
In a second step, we subtract the smoothed credit spread of AAA from all smoothed credit
spreads, so that the smoothed AAA spread is equal to zero, and the other spreads are
again expressed relatively to AAA. The respective results are depicted by the blue line in
Figure 3.8 on page 34. It can be seen that the blue smoothed curve is strictly increasing,
which is what we wanted to achieve.
3.7.2 Spread Change Test
When analyzing the effect of a possible future credit rating change on financing behavior,
the absolute value of the credit spread is irrelevant, because only the change in credit
spread will be reflected in incremental or decremental financing cash flows of a firm. The
possible spread changes to the next higher and next lower rating can easily be computed by
subtracting the respective spreads from each other. In order to facilitate interpretations,
we use the absolute value of all credit spread changes. A credit spread change to the next
higher rating is therefore expressed as positive number, even though the spread decreases.
The obtained credit spread changes are depicted in Figure 3.9 on page 36.
The green curve in the diagram shows the potential upwards change of a credit spread
(hence the difference between the next higher rating and the current rating) by rating,
while the red line shows the same for downwards changes. What is striking is that the
credit spread change is relatively constant from AAA to A- and then more than doubles
in size for ratings from BBB+ to B+. After B, the credit spread change increase again






















































Figure 3.9: Upwards (green), downwards (red) and average (gray dashed) credit spread
change by micro-rating. Numeric results in Table A.14 on page 66.
It can thus be seen that at the investment-grade border between BBB- and BB+ credit
spread changes are indeed higher than average. However, the high change in credit spread
does not only occur at the border itself, but also at neighboring ratings from roughly BBB
to BB-. Moreover, the credit spread change for CCC ratings is even higher than around the
investment-grade border. If we ignore for a moment eventual qualitative effects of credit
rating changes (for example the earlier mentioned investment restrictions for speculative-
grade ratings), then there seems to be no reason why a firm should be more worried to
cross the investment-grade border at BBB- to BB+ than being downgraded for example
from BB+ to BB.
The larger the credit spread change is at a certain rating, the stronger should the incentive
of a firm be to obtain a higher rating or at least maintain the current one. This is because
of two reasons. On the one hand, a large potential upside change provides an incentive to
obtain an upgrade and benefit from a significantly lower credit spread. On the other hand,
a large downside change presents a threat of incurring a significantly higher credit spread
when being downgraded, and firms should thus be particularly careful about worsening
their creditworthiness.
Plus or Minus Test
In order to test whether this holds in the data, we regress the net debt issuance of firms
in the sample on their respective potential credit spread change. We are also interested
in understanding whether the credit spread change might explain why we found out with
the plus or minus test in section 3.2 that firms tend to issue less net debt when they
have a plus or a minus in their credit rating. We therefore include also the plus or minus
dummy variables in the regression models. Furthermore, we also compute interaction
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terms between these dummy variables and the credit spread change variables, in order to
see whether an eventual effect of a plus or minus rating is stronger when the credit spread
change is large.
We compute the regressions first with the combined plus or minus dummy variable. Cor-
responding to that, we use the average credit spread change, which we define as the
arithmetic mean between an upwards and downwards credit spread change. It is shown
by the gray dashed line in Figure 3.9. In a second step, we compute the regression with
separate plus or minus dummy variables and thus also separate upwards or downwards
credit spread changes. We compute the interaction terms for plus ratings with upwards
credit spread changes and minus ratings with downwards credit spread changes. By do-
ing so, we test for firms’ financing incentives at macro-rating borders taking into account
the expected credit spread change when crossing such a border. We finally also compute
the combined regression without control variables, in order to test whether the control
variables maybe drive eventual significant coefficients. Similarly to the earlier tests we
carried out, we first compute the regression on a sample in which only large debt offerings
are excluded, while we afterwards use a sample which excludes both large debt and large
equity offerings.
The regression results are summarized in Table 3.9 on page 38. It is important to note
that we rescale the credit spread changes by multiplying with 100. This facilitates inter-
pretation, since now a coefficient of 0.01 means that with a one percentage point spread
change, net debt issuance is increased by one percentage point relative to total assets.
The average credit spread change (denoted as ∆̄sup,down) always results strongly signif-
icantly negative, independently of the exact regression specification. This means that
firms which would incur a strong credit spread change following a rating change will be
more prudent with their net debt issuances. This is completely in line with what was
hypothesized before.
When the upwards and downwards credit spread changes are included separately from
each other, the upwards credit spread change results again strongly significantly negative,
while the downwards change does not reach significance. This however does not auto-
matically mean that firms do not consider a potential downwards credit spread change
when taking financing decisions. The upside and downside spread changes are strongly
correlated, which is reflected by a correlation coefficient of 0.8431. It seems likely that
the upside change variable takes on the entire effect on the net debt issuance. In fact, the
separate downside change variable is strongly significant when computing the regression
without the upside change variable.
It is also interesting to look at what happens to the plus or minus variables. In the initial
plus or minus test in subsection 3.2.1, the combined plus or minus variable as well as
the separate minus variable had been found to be significantly negative, while the plus
variable was negative but not significant. Now, none of these variables results significant
anymore, apart from the combined plus or minus variable when omitting control variables.
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Excluding Large Debt Offerings Excluding Large Debt & Equity Offerings
1 2 3 4 5 6
CRPOM −0.0028 −0.0065∗∗ −0.0031 −0.0062∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0025) (0.0025)
CRPOM ∗ ∆̄sup,down −0.0029 0.0041 −0.0005 0.0070
(0.0156) (0.0160) (0.0128) (0.0130)
CRPlus 0.0045 0.0015
(0.0031) (0.0025)




CRMinus ∗ ∆sdown −0.0067 0.0065
(0.0179) (0.0136)
∆s̄up,down −0.1284∗∗∗ −0.2302∗∗∗ −0.1199∗∗∗ −0.1960∗∗∗





Controls Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Table 3.9: Summary of regression results of plus or minus credit spread change test, with spread
change under upgrade ∆sup, ∆sdown and average spread change ∆s̄up,down. Dependent variable:
net debt issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Complete results in Table A.15 on page 67.
The interaction terms of the average credit spread change with the plus or minus variables
are in nearly all cases insignificant. The only significant interaction term is between
the separate plus variable and the upwards credit spread change, which is significantly
negative. It could indicate that there are some discrete macro-rating effects that are not
explained by the credit spread change. However, since these are interaction terms, the
effects only apply in combination with high credit spread changes.
One aspect that one could think of here are debt contracts whose implied interest rate
only changes when a macro-rating border is crossed, which might be the case when specific
covenants are part of the debt contract. In such a case, a firm would significantly adjust
its financing behavior if it is close to being upgraded to the next-higher macro-rating
(and is hence located at a plus-rating) and the credit spread change when crossing the
macro-rating border is large. Still, this is mostly likely not a frequent case, since normally
debt covenants regard downgrades, not upgrades.
All in all, it seems that whether a firm is close to crossing the border between two macro-
ratings does not have a large effect on its financing behavior. It rather seems to be the
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rating-specific potential change in credit spread that determines whether a firm is more
or less likely to issue debt instead of equity.
High or Low Test
We would expect that the effect of a high credit spread change is higher when a firm is
actually close to being up- or downgraded. Whether the latter one is the case is covered
by the high or low credit score test, which was originally carried out in section 3.3. We
can carry out a test similar to the plus or minus test with credit spread changes from
before, but this time including the high or low dummy variables. We are in particular
interested in the interaction terms, since they reflect the underlying hypothesis that the
effect of the credit spread change should have the most influence on a firm’s financing
behavior when the firm is actually also likely to incur the change due to being up- or
downgraded.
Excluding Large Debt Offerings Excluding Large Debt & Equity Offerings
1 2 3 4 5 6
CRHOL −0.0049 −0.0058 −0.0039 −0.0046
(0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0029) (0.0029)
CRHOL ∗ ∆̄sup,down 0.0244 0.0254 0.0120 0.0125
(0.0207) (0.0214) (0.0155) (0.0158)
CRHigh −0.0096∗∗∗ 0.0012
(0.0034) (0.0029)





CRLow ∗ ∆sdown −0.0453∗ −0.0083
(0.0236) (0.0162)
∆s̄up,down −0.1557∗∗∗ −0.2525∗∗∗ −0.1316∗∗∗ −0.1962∗∗∗





Controls Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Table 3.10: Summary of regression results of high or low credit spread change test, with spread
change under upgrade ∆sup, ∆sdown and average spread change ∆s̄up,down. Dependent variable:
net debt issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Complete results in Table A.16 on page 68.
The results of this test are summarized in Table 3.10. As in the plus or minus test, the
credit spread change is strongly significantly negative. The only exception is again the
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downwards change when including also the upwards change, which again is most likely
caused by the high correlation of the two variables.
Most of the coefficients on the high or low variables are not statistically different from
zero. Exceptions are the high third coefficient when excluding only large debt offerings,
which is significantly negative, as well as the low third coefficient under the same sample
specification, which is significantly positive. Similar coefficients had already been found
in the first high or low test in section 3.3, where the credit spread change was not included
The interaction terms between the credit score variables and the credit spread change
are also mostly insignificant. The high third variable interacted with the upwards credit
spread results significantly positive at a 10% confidence level. This is counter-intuitive,
since firms are more likely to obtain an upgrade and thus benefit from the upside change
when they are in the high third of their micro-rating. Thus, these firms should have
a stronger incentive not to issue debt, but the coefficient indicates the opposite. The
other significant interaction term concerns the low third credit score together with the
downwards credit spread change. This value results significantly negative, which is in line
with what one would expect.
Overall, the interaction terms obtained in the high or low test did not follow the expected
format. This could be because the computed credit score model does not accurately
predict the position of a firm inside a micro-rating or because there is simply no effect of
the position of a firm inside a credit rating on its financing behavior.
3.7.3 Spread Change and Outstanding Debt Test
Plus or Minus Test
The inclusion of the potential credit spread change already lead to very significant results.
The question is now how this model can be further expanded in order to capture the firms’
decision making realities even better.
In the earlier model, we treated all firms within a micro-rating equally, since the re-
spective computed credit spread change is the same for all firms within the same micro-
rating. However, the degree to which a firm is vulnerable to credit spread changes depends
strongly on the amount of debt in a firm. In an over-simplifying example, a firm with a
very low amount of outstanding debt will not notice a significant difference in financing
cost if the credit spread on its debt will change, whereas a highly leveraged firm will be
subject to large financing cost changes when a similar credit spread change takes place.
In order to account for this, we will in this subsection compute a model similar to the
earlier one, but multiply the credit spread change with the total amount of outstanding
long-term debt divided by outstanding assets. This combined variable will serve as proxy
for the degree to which a firm’s financing cost will change following a rating change. The
rest of the model will be built exactly as in the previous analysis.
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∆s̄up,down ∗ D/A −0.3322∗∗∗ −0.4665∗∗∗
(0.0418) (0.0220)
∆sup ∗ D/A −0.2722∗∗∗
(0.0440)
∆sdown ∗ D/A −0.0628∗
(0.0378)
CRPOM ∗ ∆̄sup,down ∗ D/A 0.0411 0.0609∗∗
(0.0270) (0.0269)
CRPlus ∗ ∆sup ∗ D/A 0.0298
(0.0326)
CRMinus ∗ ∆sdown ∗ D/A 0.0499
(0.0322)
Controls Yes Yes No
Table 3.11: Summary of regression results of plus or minus credit spread change multiplied with
outstanding debt test, with spread change under upgrade ∆sup, ∆sdown and average spread
change ∆s̄up,down. Dependent variable: net debt issuance.
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Complete results in Table A.17 on page 69.
The regression results are summarized in Table 3.11. We have shown before that even
after including the credit spread change in our models, there is no large difference between
excluding only large debt or also large equity offerings. For better readability, only the
results for a sample which excludes large debt and large equity offerings will be shown
from now on. In the appendix, the results for both samples will be shown.
The rating impact variable results significantly negative, both when taken as the average
of an up- and downgrade as well as when considering separate up- and downgrades. This
is different from the specification before, where the downwards credit spread change was
found to be negative, but not significant.
What is striking is that unlike in the earlier tests, all plus or minus rating variables result
significantly negative, whereas in the earlier test, only the combined plus or minus variable
was found to be significantly negative and only when the control variables were omitted.
The interaction terms result again all insignificant with one exception, which this time
is the coefficient on the combined plus or minus variable with the average rating impact
proxy variable, which is found to be significantly positive.
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Excluding Large Excluding Large Debt
Debt Offerings & Equity Offerings
1 2 3 4 5 6
∆s 0.1023 0.1034 0.0432 0.1045 0.1060 0.0454
∆s ∗ D/A 0.1118 0.1122 0.0764 0.1125 0.1129 0.0751
Table 3.12: Adjusted R2 compared between model with only credit spread change (see
Table A.15 on page 67) versus model with credit spread change multiplied with outstanding debt
(see Table A.17 on page 69).
In order to understand whether this modified model can explain better how firms take their
financing decisions, we should also consider the development of the model fit, measured
by R2. It is shown in Table 3.12 for all six model specifications. It can easily be seen
that no matter how the model is precisely constructed, R2 always increases compared to
when only the credit spread change was included in the model.
It could be argued that this increase in R2 is simply because with the inclusion of the firm’s
debt in the credit rating impact variable, another variable is included in the model, which
maybe generally increases the model fit without giving a better insight on underlying
fundamentals. However, the debt level of a firm was already included in the control
variables before. In the specifications without control variables, which are equations 3 and
6 in Table 3.12, R2 does indeed increase the most from the earlier model to the current
one. However, there is still an increase in the other equations, where the debt level was
already included in the control variables. This means that additional explanatory power
is given by the interaction of the debt level with the credit spread change, which is exactly
in line with what had been hypothesized before.
It should however not be not be ignored that also the plus or minus variables all result
significantly negative now. This is especially surprising since they did not all result
significantly negative in the earlier “pure” plus or minus tests, which had been carried
out exactly as suggested by Kisgen (2006). It seems that while the quantitative measure
of financing cost changes play an important role in financing behavior, there are also
qualitative benefits from passing to a higher macro-rating, which are not covered by the
credit spread change itself. We will later on try to identify where these apply the most
and whether the investment-grade border might have something to do with this.
High or Low Test
Also in the extended rating change model, we can include the dummy variables for high or
low credit scores in order to test the effect of the position of a firm within its micro-rating.
As before, we would expect that in particular the interaction term between the position
of a firm inside a micro-rating and the impact of a rating change has a significant effect
on the financing behavior of a firm.
42








∆s̄up,down ∗ D/A −0.4238∗∗∗ −0.4993∗∗∗
(0.0498) (0.0298)
∆sup ∗ D/A −0.3254∗∗∗
(0.0477)
∆sdown ∗ D/A −0.0740
(0.0512)
CRHOL ∗ ∆̄sup,down ∗ D/A 0.0414 0.0194
(0.0372) (0.0372)
CRHigh ∗ ∆sup ∗ D/A −0.0860∗∗
(0.0398)
CRLow ∗ ∆sdown ∗ D/A 0.0633
(0.0422)
Controls Yes Yes No
Table 3.13: Summary of regression results of high or low credit spread change multiplied with
outstanding debt test, with spread change under upgrade ∆sup, ∆sdown and average spread
change ∆s̄up,down. Dependent variable: net debt issuance.
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Complete results in Table A.18 on page 70.
The results of the high or low test are summarized in Table 3.13. Here, the rating change
impact variable results significantly negative when looking at the average of an up- and
downgrade as well as a separate upgrade variable, while it is negative but not significant
when looking at a downgrade. This is similar to the what had been found in the credit
spread change test without the outstanding debt, where the downgrade variable was not
significant either. Already there, it had been explained that this is most likely due to
the significant correlation between the upwards- and downwards-directed spread change
variables. Here, both variables are multiplied with the same quantity (the outstanding
debt divided by assets), so the correlation between the two measures does not change.
Hence, the insignificant downwards coefficients are again probably caused by the fact that
the upwards variable takes on the largest part of the effect.
What is new is that the high or low variables are now all insignificant or significantly
negative. This had not been the case in the credit spread change test as well as the
original high or low test. The same applies for the interaction terms of the rating change
impact with the amount of debt, where again all are either insignificant or significantly
negative. Potentially, the unexpected results we obtained earlier, in particular in the high
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or low test, resulted from overlapping effects from the potential rating change impact,
which the regression now controls for.
3.7.4 Investment-Grade Border Test with Rating Change Impact
We found before that even after controlling for the credit rating change impact, there still
seem to be abnormal financing effects around macro-rating borders. We will now test
whether these can be explained by the investment-grade border.
We could see before that there is no substantial difference between including the average
rating change impact or distinguishing between an upwards or downwards directed change.
We will therefore only include the average rating change impact in this test. In order to
test for abnormal financing behavior around the investment grade border, we include the
investment grade border dummy variable introduced in section 3.5. It is again either 1 for
the credit ratings BBB- and BB+ (narrow definition) or for the ratings BBB to BB (wide
definition). Moreover, the usual control variables are included. This yields the following
regression equation:
∆NetDebti,t = α+ β1∆s̄up,down ∗ D/A + β2CRIG/SG + φKi,t + εi,t (3.15)
We carry out the regression both on a sample excluding only large debt offerings as well
as excluding large debt and equity offerings. The results are summarized in Table 3.14.
Excluding Large Excluding Large Debt
Debt Offerings & Equity Offerings
BBB- and BB+ BBB to BB BBB- and BB+ BBB to BB
∆s̄up,down ∗ D/A −0.3661∗∗∗ −0.3732∗∗∗ −0.3054∗∗∗ −0.3082∗∗∗
(0.0399) (0.0418) (0.0378) (0.0397)
CRIG/SG 0.0037
∗∗ 0.0035∗∗ 0.0002 0.0007
(0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0013)
Table 3.14: Summary of regression results of credit spread change multiplied with outstanding
debt and investment-grade border test. Dependent variable: net debt issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗
denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Complete results in Table A.19 on
page 71.
The credit spread change results again strongly significantly negative, as had been found
in the tests before. Surprisingly, the investment grade border variable has a significantly
positive effect on net debt issuances when only large debt offerings are excluded, while it
results insignificant when both large debt and equity offerings are excluded. This is exactly
the opposite of what had been found in the investment grade border test in section 3.5,
where the investment grade border variable was found to be significantly negative.
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This change is caused by the inclusion of the credit spread change. As shown by the
graphical representation of the credit spread changes in Figure 3.9 on page 36, the spread
change is particularly high in the range roughly between BBB and BB-. The spread change
coefficient thus seems to take on the abnormal negative net debt issuances around the
investment grade border which we had found earlier, but there seems to be no abnormal
negative effect that exceeds what is predicted by the spread change.
3.7.5 Macro-Rating Border Test
Controlling only for Rating Change Impact
It had been found by the plus or minus test in subsection 3.7.3 that there is a significantly
negative net debt issuance around broad rating borders even when controlling for the ex-
pected rating change impact. The test for the investment grade border in subsection 3.7.4
had however shown that the investment-grade border is not the cause of that behavior.
Surprisingly, it might even have an effect in the opposite direction.
The question is thus at which broad rating borders this negative effect is the strongest, in
order to eventually gain insights on what might drive the effect. To do so, a test similar to
the one with the investment-grade border is carried out, but this time dummy variables
for all macro-rating borders are included. As an example, the broad rating border variable
“AAA” will capture effects at the credit ratings AAA1 and AA+, the variable “AA” will
capture the ratings AA- and A+, and so on. The specification is alway chosen narrowly,
hence covering only one micro-rating to each side, since otherwise the dummy variables
would overlap at the middle micro-ratings without plus or minus.
Moreover, we again control for the credit rating change impact in order to see at which
macro-rating borders the effect exceeds what is predicted by the numerical rating change
impact. The regression model is thus:







+φKi,t + εi,t (3.16)
Figure 3.10 on page 46 shows graphically the found coefficients of abnormal net debt
issuances at the macro-rating borders for a sample excluding only large debt issuance in
green and excluding both large debt and equity issuances in blue.
The obtained abnormal net debt issuance behavior around macro-rating borders is sig-
nificantly positive at the borders from AAA to AA+ and AA- to A+, and significantly
negative from BB- to B+ and B- to CCC+. It seems reasonable that firms at low ratings
pay particular attention to having a better macro-rating than at higher ratings. However,
1Standard & Poors does not state micro-ratings for AAA-rated firms, which is why the micro-rating









AAA/AA AA/A A/BBB BBB/BB BB/B B/CCC
Figure 3.10: Macro-rating border coefficients, controlling for economic impact of rating
changes, excluding large debt offerings (green) as well as large debt and equity
offerings (blue). Numeric results in Table A.20 on page 72.
it appears odd that at high ratings, firms seem to issue even more net debt when being
close to a macro-rating border. It seems likely that there are other factors not included
in our analysis that cause this behavior.
3.7.6 Controlling for Rating Change Impact and Macro-Rating Differ-
ences
The macro-rating test has shown that firms at lower macro-rating borders issue signifi-
cantly less net debt. These lower coefficients could however also be due to lower overall
net debt issuances at lower ratings. This was already found in the beginning of our anal-
ysis: Figure 3.2 on page 14 shows that in particular firms with a credit rating lower than
BB have a low net debt issuance. We thus want to test whether the abnormal net debt
issuance behavior at macro-ratings is due to a specific pattern around just these macro-
rating borders or whether it can be explained with overall net debt issuance behaviors at
in particular lower macro-ratings.
In the following test, we will thus not only include dummy variables covering the macro-
rating borders, but also control for overall net debt issuance levels at macro-ratings.
Hence, we include a dummy variable AAA which covers AAA, a variable AA which
covers AA+, AA and AA- and so on. We do not include an intercept in order to being
able to compute coefficients on all macro-ratings. Our regression equation is thus:
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What should be noted is that the middle micro-rating of each macro-rating, hence the
one without plus or minus, is not covered by the border dummy variables. This means
that the overall lower net debt issuances at lower ratings should be covered by the macro-
rating dummy variables, because otherwise the middle micro-ratings would be left out.
Consequently, the remaining effect captured by the border dummy variables should really








AAA/AA AA/A A/BBB BBB/BB BB/B B/CCC
Figure 3.11: Macro-rating border coefficients, controlling for economic impact of rating
changes and overall differences between macro-ratings, excluding large debt offerings
(green) as well as large debt and equity offerings (blue). Numeric results in Table A.21
on page 73.
The obtained coefficients on the border dummy variables are shown in Figure 3.11 on
page 47. As expected, controlling for overall macro-rating differences reduces the size
of the border coefficients significantly. Apart from the BB/B border coefficient, none of
the coefficients results significantly different from zero. The coefficient on the BB/B is
significantly negative at a 5% level, both when excluding only large debt issuances or both
large debt and equity issuances.
It is not clear whether the negative coefficient on the BB/B border is a pure statistical
coincidence or whether there really is some kind of incentive for a firm to pass this macro-
rating border, which is a stronger incentive than at any other border. According to the
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credit rating agency itself, there is no qualitative difference between the two ratings, but
firms rated B are “more vulnerable than the obligors rated BB” (Standard & Poor’s,
2018). One possibility would thus be that some firms have specific debt covenants in
place that require them to maintain a BB rating, which is why they would be particularly
careful when issuing net debt around the respective rating border.
In addition, there could be other effects that cause this specific border to show an abnor-
mally negative debt issuance behavior. These could include in particular difficulties to
issue debt in general due to the low credit ratings. We would however expect that such
overall different debt issuance levels are captured by the macro-rating dummy variables,
since these capture not only micro-ratings with a plus or minus, but also the ones in the
middle without sign. We can therefore not finally conclude whether the negative issuance
behavior between BB and B is really caused by some underlying mechanism or whether
it is just a statistical coincidence.
3.7.7 Controlling for PV of debt
In the final section of our analysis, we will try to combine several aspects of our analysis.
We have seen that the credit spread change does play an important role when deciding on
the amount of net debt to issue, and even more so if also the amount of outstanding debt
is considered as well. Moreover, we have seen in section 3.6 that also the term structure
of the outstanding debt influences the financing decision. We therefore want to try to
connect these aspects in a combined model.
The link between the maturity of a debt instrument and a change in its credit spread
is that since normally the credit spread on the obligation is fixed throughout the whole
lifetime, the credit spread will only change when the obligation has to be refinanced at its
maturity. This means that the maturity of a debt instrument determines when the new
credit spread will materialize in incremental or decremental cash flows for a firm. After
the respective instrument has been refinanced, the new credit spread will have to be paid
in every subsequent period2. We can therefore value the credit spread change of a debt
instrument as perpetual cash flow. For a separate debt instrument, we could therefore







Given the available data, we are not able to distinguish between specific debt instruments
of firms. However, Compustat provides for each of the five years subsequent to an obser-
vation the amount of debt that will mature. We can use this together with the expected
credit spread change to value the impact of a credit rating change for these five years.
2This assumes that the credit rating will remain stable after a rating change. Since credit ratings have
been shown to be tendentially sticky (e.g. Posch, 2011), it seems reasonable that credit ratings do not
change twice in a short timespan, unless the firm takes a new decision to change its net debt issuance and
hence capital structure.
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We have to consider however that in our dataset, debt that matures in the next five
years covers only about 43% of total outstanding debt. It is therefore important not to
ignore the impact of a credit rating change on debt that will mature after the five year
horizon. In order to correctly discount effects on this debt we need to know when such a
change takes place. In their analysis of corporate long-term debt issuances, Badoer and
James (2016) state the average maturity as well as the number of number of occurrences
of corporate debt issuances of US-American firms between 1987 and 2009 for maturities
between 5 and 10 years, 10 and 20 years and longer than 20 years.
It is important to highlight that the maturities stated by Badoer and James are maturities
at issuance. We however need the average maturity of already outstanding debt. These
two numbers are not the same, since the maturity of debt issued in the past will obviously
decrease every year by 1 until it matures. We will assume here that debt issuances are not
grouped together in time, hence every year the same amount of debt for each maturity
is issued. This issuance is assumed to be equal to the amount of debt maturing, which
is the same assumption that has already been made earlier. We further assume that
the maturity structure of the debt is kept constant, hence if for example a 10 year bond
matures, a new 10 year bond with the same face value and maturity is issued immediately
in order to replace the old one.
This implies that if we consider all outstanding debt of a firm with a specific (initial)
maturity, the single debt instruments will have remaining maturities distributed evenly
between zero and and the initial maturity. For example, out of the debt of a firm with an
initial maturity of three years, one third will mature in one year, one third in two years
and one third in three years.
For our analysis, we only need the average maturity of debt with a residual maturity larger
than five years, because we have precise data on debt with remaining maturities of less
than five years. We therefore compute from the maturities at issuance from Badoer and
James the average remaining maturities of debt instruments with a remaining maturity
larger than five years. Since the maturity of a debt instrument decreases linearly, we can
take the arithmetic average between the lowest and highest possible residual maturity as
residual maturity, since we assume that the residual maturities are distributed evenly. The
lowest possible residual maturity is five, since as explained we do not consider maturities
below five years since they are covered by the Compustat data. For each debt group of
Badoer and James, we thus compute the average residual maturity as:
Residual Maturity =
Maturity at Issuance + 5
2
(3.19)
In order to compute the correct weighted average of the residual maturity, we also need
the number of debt issuances per maturity group. Also here, we have to adjust the data
from Badoer and James, since a portion of the debt already has a residual maturity
below five years. Again, we can exploit the assumption of even distribution of residual





∗ (Maturity at Issuance − 5) (3.20)
From this, we can then compute an adjusted weighted average of the residual maturity
of debt with a maturity of more than five years. The computation with the data from
Badoer and James can be seen in Table 3.15. We arrive at an average residual maturity
of 9.41 years.
Group N Maturity N Residual
at Issuance T > 5 Maturity
5-10y 10 158 6.62 2 485 5.81
10-20y 3 868 11.06 2 119 8.03
> 20y 1 620 31.23 1 361 18.11
Total 15 646 10.26 5 965 9.41
Table 3.15: Corporate debt maturities at issuance and observations according to Badoer and
James (2016) as well as adjusted observations (according to Equation 3.19) and residual
maturities (according to Equation 3.20)
With this value, we now have a reasonable estimate of the term structure of the debt
of the firms in our sample. In Equation 3.18, we had stated how the impact of a credit
spread change on a single debt instrument can be valued. With this, we can compute the
entire impact of a credit rating change as the sum of the impact on all maturities, thus
for the maturities of one to five years (for which we have the specific data) as well as the
remaining debt with an assumed average residual maturity of 9.41 years. All in all, the







(1 + r)(t−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸










(1 + r)9.41−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Remaining debt not maturing in next five years
(3.21)
One more parameter is however missing for the valuation of a credit rating change, which
is the correct discount rate to use. An appropriate discount rate accounts for the riskiness
of the involved cash flows. The incremental or decremental cash flows from a credit rating
change will only take place as long as the debt of the respective firm still pays interest.
The riskiness of the credit spread change cash flows can therefore be assumed to be similar
to the riskiness of the underlying debt. In efficient capital markets, the interest rate that
a debt obligation bears should reflect its risk level. We therefore use the interest rate that
a firm pays as discount rate for the valuation.
We use the same computation method for the implied interest rate of a firm as used
for the credit spread curve construction. Its computation is shown in Equation 3.12 on
page 34. In order to control for outliers and in order to use only reasonable discount rates,
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we winsorize the implied interest rates at 5% and 95%. By doing so, we obtain a mean
discount rate of 7.34%. The lowest and highest value are 3.10% and 12.74%, respectively.
All in all, we seem to achieve reasonable discount rates.
With this information, we can now compute the present value of a credit rating change
for every firm in the sample for which the necessary fields are available. Then, we can
compute a plus or minus test as had been done for the earlier tests.












CRMinus ∗ PVdown 0.0036
(0.0032)






Controls Yes Yes No
Table 3.16: Summary of regression results of plus or minus impact valuation test. Dependent
variable: net debt issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively. Complete results in Table A.22 on page 74.
The results from the test are summarized in Table 3.16. As in the earlier test of the
credit spread change multiplied with the amount of total outstanding debt, the credit
rating change impact as well as the plus or minus variables are all significantly negative.
The only exception is the downwards change impact variable, which is most likely insignif-
icant because of the overlapping effect with the upwards change variable. The interaction
terms between plus or minus variables with the rating change valuation are mostly in-
significant, with the exception of the plus rating variable with the upgrade valuation,
which is significantly positive at a 10% level.
Summarizing, we see that the results are very similar to what we had already achieved by
simply multiplying the credit spread change with the amount of total outstanding debt.
In order to understand whether we gained additional explanatory power by enhancing our
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1 2 3 4 5 6
With ∆s ∗D 0.1118 0.1122 0.0764 0.1125 0.1129 0.0751
With PV 0.1010 0.1016 0.0341 0.0979 0.0992 0.0361
Table 3.17: Adjusted R2 compared between model with credit spread change multiplied with
total outstanding debt (see Table A.17 on page 69) versus model with credit rating change
impact valuation (see Table A.22 on page 74).
model, we can compare the model fit of the different models. In Table 3.17, the adjusted
R2 of the two approaches is shown. It can be seen that for every of the six model
specifications, the model fit was higher when using the credit spread change multiplied
with the total outstanding debt.
It seems that the more complicated approach to precisely value the impact of a credit
rating change did not pay out. It has to be considered however that we had to take
some limiting assumptions due to data unavailabilities. These include the appropriate
discount rate, which we approximated with the implied interest rate of a firm, as well as
the term structure of the debt after a five year horizon, where we used an average value
for all firms, without taking into account firm-individual differences in debt with a long
maturity. Moreover, we had seen in the term structure analysis that there is no 1:1 link
between debt that matures and debt that is reissued, even though firms tend to issue
more debt when more debt matures. This missing direct mechanism hinders however the




In the beginning of the analysis, we tried to replicate the main findings of Kisgen (2006)
on the same sample. While the plus or minus test yielded similar results, we struggled
in particular to replicate his credit score test. These difficulties might come especially
from sample selection choices. We then expanded the analysis to a longer time horizon,
covering 16 additional years. Our findings in the plus or minus test were relatively similar,
even though we could not confirm the significantly negative effect of a plus-rating on a
firm’s net debt issuance behavior. We explained that this could have something to do
with a higher difficulty of obtaining an upgrade after the financial crises of the 2000’s.
In the high or low test, we were not able to replicate the results of Kisgen. It seems that
the obtained results depend strongly on the sample specification. We found that firms
even issue significantly more net debt when being close to a downgrade, but this finding
vanished when excluding large equity offerings from the sample, which is a modification
that Kisgen has not carried out.
We then assumed that the effect of a being close to an up- or downgrade on financing
should be even stronger when such a rating change would lead to a new macro-rating,
but were not able to prove that in the data using our interaction test between the the
plus or minus and high or low variables. We then looked isolatedly at abnormal financing
behavior around the investment-grade border, where we found a significantly negative
effect on net debt issuance, which is in line with Kisgen’s findings.
In the later parts of the analysis, we include elements in the analysis that had not been
included in Kisgen’s work. We first took into consideration the term structure of a firm’s
outstanding debt. We used two different test specifications and found in both that firms
finance tendentially more with equity rather than with debt if large amounts of debt will
mature soon, but this happens independently from what credit rating a firm has or how
close it seems to be to an up- or downgrade.
We then started to account for the concrete economic impact of a credit rating change on
a firm. We found the credit spread change at a certain credit rating to be a significantly
negative driver of net debt issuances. This is potentially because of a two-sided effect:
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On the one hand, a large credit spread change encourages a firm to obtain an upgrade,
since the interest rate burden after such an upgrade would decrease more strongly. On
the other hand, a downgrade has a stronger impact on a firm if the credit spread change
is expected to be large, which makes a firm again more prudent when issuing debt rather
than equity.
Subsequently, we considered the credit rating change multiplied with the amount of out-
standing debt of a firm, in order to better account for what economic impact a credit
rating change would have on a firm. We still found abnormal negative net debt issuance
when a firm has a plus or minus rating, which exceeds what can be explained using the
pure economic impact of a rating change through the credit spread change mechanism.
This finding could also not be explained with the investment-grade border. The earlier
found prudent debt issuance around that border seems to be explainable by the relatively
high credit spread change in that rating region.
The significant effect of plus or minus ratings on financing was found to be driven in
particular by low-rated firms. After controlling for overall lower net debt issuances at
lower credit ratings, only an abnormal negative effect at the border between BB and B
ratings persisted. It is not clear whether this is really caused by a stronger incentive of
firms to stay ahead of this border or whether this result can be considered a statistical
coincidence.
Finally, we tried to built a model which precisely values the impact of a credit rating
change for each firm, but encountered difficulties, in particular with regard to lacking
information about the precise debt maturity structure of a firm after a five year horizon
as well as the absence of an appropriate discount rate for the future cash flows. Even
though the results of this test confirmed that firms consider the economic impact of a
potential credit rating change, we did not gain more explanatory power compared to the
more simplified model with the potential credit spread change multiplied with the total
amount of outstanding debt.
All in all, it seems that there is a connection between credit ratings and corporate financ-
ing behavior, but this link does not have the same strength at all credit ratings. It is
particularly strong whenever the discrepancy between the credit spread levels of two credit
ratings is large as well. We cannot exclude however that there are some discrete benefits
of staying ahead of certain macro-rating borders, as we found at the BB and B border.
It is however counter-intuitive that such an effect is not found at the investment-grade
border.
Starting from this analysis, an appropriate next step could be to try to build a more
robust valuation model of the economic impact of a credit rating change on firms and test
for residual effects at credit rating borders. Also, a different specification of the high or




AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A
Number of Observations 374 199 744 894 1 650 2 737
D/(D+E)
Mean 31.1% 30.4% 38.6% 40.3% 41.2% 43.0%
Median 26.8% 25.0% 38.0% 38.9% 40.8% 41.8%
Std Dev. 21.3% 22.1% 18.3% 21.5% 21.1% 20.4%
A- BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB
Number of Observations 2 475 2 997 3 638 2 814 1 829 2 481
D/(D+E)
Mean 43.5% 44.1% 45.3% 44.6% 47.5% 49.3%
Median 43.3% 44.8% 45.2% 44.4% 47.4% 48.6%
Std Dev. 18.7% 18.8% 18.9% 19.0% 20.5% 20.0%
BB- B+ B B- CCC+ or Below
Number of Observations 2 935 2 737 1 445 673 448
D/(D+E)
Mean 53.9% 58.1% 61.1% 60.9% 58.1%
Median 54.3% 59.0% 62.8% 63.3% 62.5%
Std Dev. 21.6% 21.9% 22.7% 24.3% 26.5%
Table A.1: Mean, median and standard deviation of leverage by credit rating
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Rating Observations Debt Issuance Equity Issuance Net Debt Issuance
AAA 374 2.38% −2.28% 4.65%
AA+ 199 1.50% −2.06% 3.57%
AA 744 2.06% −1.70% 3.76%
AA- 894 1.75% −1.42% 3.17%
A+ 1 650 2.63% −1.77% 4.40%
A 2 737 2.34% −1.35% 3.69%
A- 2 475 2.25% −1.13% 3.37%
BBB+ 2 997 2.21% −1.00% 3.21%
BBB 3 638 1.68% −0.75% 2.44%
BBB- 2 814 2.15% −0.45% 2.60%
BB+ 1 829 2.61% −0.57% 3.18%
BB 2 481 3.30% −0.16% 3.47%
BB- 2 935 3.19% 0.85% 2.35%
B+ 2 737 3.17% 2.01% 1.16%
B 1 445 3.39% 2.29% 1.10%
B- 673 2.74% 4.10% −1.37%
CCC+ 190 −1.28% 4.31% −5.59%
CCC 87 0.28% 4.45% −4.17%
CCC- 38 −0.24% 3.82% −4.06%
CC 31 −4.43% 3.29% −7.72%
C 1 −8.47% 0.01% −8.49%
D 83 −2.27% 2.82% −5.08%
SD 18 1.33% 2.26% −0.93%


















Adj. R2 0.0211 0.0210 0.0000
N 31 070 31 070 31 070
Table A.3: Regression results of plus or minus test with unrestricted sample. Dependent variable:
net debt issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Excluding Large Panel B: Excluding Large Debt
Debt Offerings and Equity Offerings
1 2 3 1 2 3
Intercept −0.0818∗∗∗ −0.0818∗∗∗ 0.0007 −0.0516∗∗∗ −0.0516∗∗∗ 0.0055∗∗∗
(0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0009) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0007)
CRPOM −0.0027∗∗ −0.0053∗∗∗ −0.0031∗∗∗ −0.0051∗∗∗





D/(D + E) −0.0162 −0.0162 −0.0135 −0.0135
(0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0094) (0.0094)
EBITDA/A 0.1262∗∗∗ 0.1259∗∗∗ 0.1234∗∗∗ 0.1229∗∗∗
(0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0182) (0.0182)
ln(Sales) 0.0092∗∗∗ 0.0092∗∗∗ 0.0059∗∗∗ 0.0059∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Adj. R2 0.0709 0.0709 0.0010 0.0661 0.0665 0.0013
N 20 953 20 953 20 953 20 562 20 562 20 562
Table A.4: Regression results of plus or minus test with restricted samples. Dependent variable:
net debt issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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AA A BBB BB B CCC
Panel A: Plus or Minus Tests
Regression 1
Intercept −0.0051 −0.0253 −0.0116 −0.0494 −0.0709∗∗ −0.1012
(0.0028) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0050) (0.0207)
CRPOM −0.0016 −0.0016 0.0007 0.0011 −0.0098∗∗ 0.0173
(0.0028) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0030) (0.0050) (0.0207)
Regression 2
Intercept −0.0049 −0.0242 −0.0101∗∗ −0.0447∗∗ −0.0676 −0.1012
(0.0043) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0033) (0.0053) (0.0212)
CRPlus −0.0027 0.0018 0.0048∗∗ 0.0070∗∗ −0.0053 0.0126
(0.0043) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0033) (0.0053) (0.0212)
CRMinus −0.0014 −0.0040∗∗ −0.0044∗∗ −0.0028 −0.0265∗∗∗ 0.0377
(0.0030) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0034) (0.0082) (0.0418)
Descriptive Statistics
N 1 575 5 492 6 733 3 791 2 708 202
Panel B: Credit Score Tests
Regression 1
CRHOL −0.0080∗∗ −0.0008 −0.0006 0.0067∗ 0.0058 0.0049
(0.0032) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0034) (0.0090) (0.0572)
Regression 2
CRHigh −0.0156∗∗∗ 0.0053∗∗ 0.0060∗∗ 0.0015 −0.0149 −0.0396
(0.0042) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0041) (0.0138) (0.0551)
CRLow 0.0004 −0.0074∗∗∗ −0.0070∗∗∗ 0.0122∗∗∗ 0.0254∗∗ 0.0678
(0.0050) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0044) (0.0107) (0.0800)
Descriptive Statistics
N 1 473 5 100 5 964 2 911 1 587 88
Table A.5: Regression results of plus or minus test and high or low test for separate
macro-ratings. Dependent variable: net debt issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 10%,
5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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1 2 3














Adj. R2 0.0322 0.0322 0.0001
N 24 787 24 787 24 787
Table A.6: Regression results of high or low test with unrestricted sample. Dependent variable:
net debt issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Excluding Debt Panel B: Excluding Debt
Offerings > 10% Offerings > 5%
1 2 3 1 2 3
Intercept −0.0934∗∗∗ −0.1133∗∗∗ 0.0005 −0.0958∗∗∗ −0.1127∗∗∗ −0.0061∗∗∗
(0.0069) (0.0082) (0.0012) (0.0070) (0.0087) (0.0014)
CRHOL 0.0001 −0.0001 0.0006 0.0007






D/(D + E) −0.0132 −0.0133 −0.0111 −0.0111
(0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0087) (0.0086)
EBITDA/A 0.1334∗∗∗ 0.1326∗∗∗ 0.1076∗∗∗ 0.1065∗∗∗
(0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0238) (0.0239)
ln(Sales) 0.0102∗∗∗ 0.0127∗∗∗ 0.0101∗∗∗ 0.0122∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0009)
Adj. R2 0.0712 0.0746 −0.0001 0.0655 0.0682 −0.0001
N 17 530 17 530 17 530 13 659 13 659 13 659
Table A.7: Regression results of high or low test with sample excluding debt offerings larger than
10% and 5% of total assets. Dependent variable: net debt issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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1 2 3














Adj. R2 0.0610 0.0618 0.0002
N 17 178 17 178 17 178
Table A.8: Regression results of high or low test with sample excluding debt and equity offerings
larger than 10% of total assets. Dependent variable: net debt issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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1 2 3 4
Intercept −0.0909∗∗∗ 0.0038∗∗ −0.1107∗∗∗ 0.0038∗∗














CRPOM ∗ CRHOL 0.0017 0.0006
(0.0028) (0.0029)
CRPlus ∗ CRHigh 0.0060 0.0034
(0.0037) (0.0038)
CRMinus ∗ CRHigh −0.0010 −0.0042
(0.0035) (0.0036)
CRPlus ∗ CRLow 0.0024 0.0037
(0.0040) (0.0042)
CRMinus ∗ CRLow 0.0006 −0.0010
(0.0038) (0.0039)






Adj. R2 0.0713 0.0007 0.0748 0.0084
N 17 530 17 530 17 530 17 530
Table A.9: Regression results of interaction test with plus or minus variables and high or low
variables. Dependent variable: net debt issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively.
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Panel A: BBB- and BB+ Panel B: BBB to BB
1 2 1 2
Intercept −0.0833∗∗∗ −0.0820∗∗∗ −0.0823∗∗∗ −0.0788∗∗∗
(0.0075) (0.0074) (0.0075) (0.0076)
SRIG/SG −0.0038∗∗ −0.0028∗ −0.0045∗∗∗ −0.0057∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0012)
CRPOM −0.0021∗ −0.0043∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0012)
D/(D + E) −0.0163 −0.0162 −0.0162 −0.0162
(0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110)
EBITDA/A 0.1260∗∗∗ 0.1259∗∗∗ 0.1258∗∗∗ 0.1251∗∗∗
(0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0196) (0.0196)
ln(Sales) 0.0092∗∗∗ 0.0092∗∗∗ 0.0092∗∗∗ 0.0092∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Adj. R2 0.0708 0.0709 0.0712 0.0718
N 20 953 20 953 20 953 20 953
Table A.10: Regression results of investment-grade border test. Dependent variable: net debt
issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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1 2 3 4
Intercept −0.0822∗∗∗ −0.0823∗∗∗ −0.0830∗∗∗ −0.0830∗∗∗







DD1/A −0.1346∗∗∗ −0.1346∗∗∗ −0.0102∗∗ −0.1022∗∗







D/(D + E) −0.0149 −0.0149 −0.0149 −0.0149
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103)
EBITDA/A 0.1269∗∗∗ 0.1266∗∗∗ 0.1268∗∗∗ 0.1265∗∗∗
(0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0204)
ln(Sales) 0.0094∗∗∗ 0.0095∗∗∗ 0.0095∗∗∗ 0.0095∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Adj. R2 0.0749 0.0750 0.0750 0.0752
N 19 996 19 996 19 996 19 996
Table A.11: Regression results of plus or minus term structure test. Dependent variable: net
debt issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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1 2 3 4
Intercept −0.0941∗∗∗ −0.1148∗∗∗ −0.0940∗∗∗ −0.1147∗∗∗








DD1/A −0.1195∗∗∗ −0.1117∗∗∗ −0.1226∗∗ −0.1198∗







D/(D + E) −0.0123 −0.0124 −0.0123 −0.0124
(0.0093) (0.0094) (0.0093) (0.0094)
EBITDA/A 0.1345∗∗∗ 0.1334∗∗∗ 0.1345∗∗∗ 0.1335∗∗∗
(0.0234) (0.0235) (0.0234) (0.0235)
ln(Sales) 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.0130∗∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.0130∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0695)
Adj. R2 0.0741 0.0778 0.0741 0.0777
N 16 819 16 819 16 819 16 819
Table A.12: Regression results of high or low term structure test. Dependent variable: net debt
issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Plus or Minus Test High or Low Test
1 2 1 2
Intercept −0.0692∗∗∗ −0.0998∗∗∗ −0.1005∗∗∗ −0.1439∗∗∗










D/(D + E) −0.0373∗∗∗ −0.0085 −0.0337∗∗ −0.0077
(0.0128) (0.0074) (0.0168) (0.0068)
EBITDA/A 0.0957∗∗∗ 0.1643∗∗∗ 0.0994∗∗∗ 0.1824∗∗∗
(0.0310) (0.0190) (0.0335) (0.0204)
ln(Sales) 0.0098∗∗∗ 0.0096∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗ 0.1045∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Above median No Yes No Yes
Adj. R2 0.0835 0.0750 0.0836 0.0847
N 9 999 9 999 8 411 8 410
Table A.13: Regression results of plus or minus and high or low test, where sample is subdivided
firms with lower and higher than median long-term debt maturing in one year divided by total
assets. Dependent variable: net debt issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 10%, 5% and
1% levels, respectively. Complete results in Table A.13 on page 65.
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Rating Observations Raw Spread Spread Upside Change Downside Change
AAA 369 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.07%
AA+ 194 0.16% 0.07% 0.07% 0.11%
AA 711 0.05% 0.18% 0.11% 0.08%
AA- 775 0.00% 0.26% 0.08% 0.12%
A+ 1 506 0.20% 0.37% 0.12% 0.12%
A 2 576 0.35% 0.49% 0.12% 0.14%
A- 2 323 0.50% 0.63% 0.14% 0.12%
BBB+ 2 844 0.69% 0.75% 0.12% 0.19%
BBB 3 485 0.88% 0.93% 0.19% 0.27%
BBB- 2 683 1.22% 1.20% 0.27% 0.28%
BB+ 1 782 1.50% 1.48% 0.28% 0.27%
BB 2 442 1.79% 1.75% 0.27% 0.31%
BB- 2 863 2.14% 2.06% 0.31% 0.23%
B+ 2 694 2.57% 2.29% 0.23% 0.16%
B 1 416 3.19% 2.44% 0.16% 0.22%
B- 658 3.78% 2.66% 0.22% 0.32%
CCC+ 190 4.19% 2.98% 0.32% 0.50%
CCC 87 4.43% 3.48% 0.50% 0.43%
CCC- 38 4.38% 3.91% 0.43% 0.26%
Table A.14: Observations, computed raw and smoothed credit spread and potential upside and
downside changes by credit rating
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Excluding Large Debt Offerings Excluding Large Debt & Equity Offerings
1 2 3 4 5 6
Intercept −0.0204∗∗∗ −0.0217∗∗∗ 0.0453∗∗∗ 0.0031 0.0026 0.0428∗∗∗
(0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0022) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0020)
CRPOM −0.0028 −0.0065∗∗ −0.0031 −0.0062∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0025) (0.0025)
CRPOM ∗ ∆̄sup,down −0.0029 0.0041 −0.0005 0.0070
(0.0156) (0.0160) (0.0128) (0.0130)
CRPlus 0.0045 0.0015
(0.0031) (0.0025)




CRMinus ∗ ∆sdown −0.0067 0.0065
(0.0179) (0.0136)
∆s̄up,down −0.1284∗∗∗ −0.2302∗∗∗ −0.1199∗∗∗ −0.1960∗∗∗





D/(D + E) −0.0480∗∗∗ −0.0472∗∗∗ −0.0431∗∗∗ −0.0424∗∗∗
(0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0087) (0.0087)
EBITDA/A 0.1018∗∗∗ 0.1037∗∗∗ 0.0989∗∗∗ 0.1009∗∗∗
(0.0208) (0.0210) (0.0194) (0.0196)
ln(Sales) 0.0068∗∗∗ 0.0065∗∗∗ 0.0040∗∗∗ 0.0037∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Adj. R2 0.1023 0.1034 0.0432 0.1045 0.1060 0.0454
N 20 835 20 835 20 835 20 455 20 455 20 455
Table A.15: Regression results of plus or minus credit spread change test, with spread change
under upgrade ∆sup, ∆sdown and average spread change ∆s̄up,down. Dependent variable: net
debt issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Excluding Large Debt Offerings Excluding Large Debt & Equity Offerings
1 2 3 4 5 6
Intercept −0.0262∗∗∗ −0.0430∗∗∗ 0.0482∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.0013 0.0437∗∗∗
(0.0071) (0.0088) (0.0032) (0.0052) (0.0056) (0.0025)
CRHOL −0.0049 −0.0058 −0.0039 −0.0046
(0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0029) (0.0029)
CRHOL ∗ ∆̄sup,down 0.0244 0.0254 0.0120 0.0125
(0.0207) (0.0214) (0.0155) (0.0158)
CRHigh −0.0096∗∗∗ 0.0012
(0.0034) (0.0029)





CRLow ∗ ∆sdown −0.0453∗ −0.0083
(0.0236) (0.0162)
∆s̄up,down −0.1557∗∗∗ −0.2525∗∗∗ −0.1316∗∗∗ −0.1962∗∗∗





D/(D + E) −0.0519∗∗∗ −0.0514∗∗∗ −0.0418∗∗∗ −0.0413∗∗∗
(0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0127) (0.0127)
EBITDA/A 0.1105∗∗∗ 0.1113∗∗∗ 0.1057∗∗∗ 0.1077∗∗∗
(0.0254) (0.0258) (0.0230) (0.0233)
ln(Sales) 0.0078∗∗∗ 0.0090∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0037∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Adj. R2 0.1033 0.1058 0.0414 0.0965 0.0987 0.0412
N 17 456 17 456 17 456 17 115 17 115 17 115
Table A.16: Regression results of high or low credit spread change test, with spread change
under upgrade ∆sup, ∆sdown and average spread change ∆s̄up,down. Dependent variable: net
debt issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Excluding Large Debt Offerings Excluding Large Debt & Equity Offerings
1 2 3 4 5 6
Intercept −0.0292∗∗∗ −0.0297∗∗∗ 0.0289∗∗∗ −0.0071∗∗ −0.0075∗∗ −0.0283∗∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0014) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0012)
CRPOM −0.0050∗∗∗ −0.0076∗∗∗ −0.0050∗∗∗ −0.0071∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0015)
CRPOM ∗ ∆̄sup,down ∗ D/A 0.0386 0.0609 0.0411 0.0609∗∗
(0.0371) (0.0374) (0.0270) (0.0269)
CRPlus −0.0016 −0.0028∗
(0.0020) (0.0016)




CRMinus ∗ ∆sdown ∗ D/A 0.0505 0.0499
(0.0425) (0.0322)
∆s̄up,down ∗ D/A −0.3828∗∗∗ −0.5588∗∗∗ −0.3322∗∗∗ −0.4665∗∗∗
(0.0462) (0.0290) (0.0418) (0.0220)
∆sup ∗ D/A −0.2715∗∗∗ −0.2722∗∗∗
(0.0628) (0.0440)
∆sdown ∗ D/A −0.1033∗ −0.0628∗
(0.0536) (0.0378)
D/(D + E) −0.0216∗∗ −0.0212∗∗ −0.0213∗∗ −0.0213∗∗
(0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0092) (0.0093)
EBITDA/A 0.1270∗∗∗ 0.1286∗∗∗ 0.1215∗∗∗ 0.1227∗∗∗
(0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0166) (0.0167)
ln(Sales) 0.0054∗∗∗ 0.0052∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0028∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Adj. R2 0.1118 0.1122 0.0764 0.1125 0.1129 0.0751
N 20 835 20 835 20 835 20 455 20 455 20 455
Table A.17: Regression results of plus or minus credit spread change multiplied with outstanding
debt test, with spread change under upgrade ∆sup, ∆sdown and average spread change
∆s̄up,down. Dependent variable: net debt issuance.
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively.
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Excluding Large Debt Offerings Excluding Large Debt & Equity Offerings
1 2 3 4 5 6
Intercept −0.0370∗∗∗ −0.0494∗∗∗ 0.0304∗∗∗ −0.0130∗∗∗ −0.0141∗∗∗ −0.0283∗∗∗
(0.0050) (0.0067) (0.0022) (0.0031) (0.0040) (0.0014)
CRHOL −0.0039 −0.0025 −0.0029∗ −0.0022
(0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0017) (0.0017)
CRHOL ∗ ∆̄sup,down ∗ D/A 0.0975 0.0613 0.0414 0.0194
(0.0639) (0.0652) (0.0372) (0.0372)
CRHigh −0.0048∗ 0.0014
(0.0025) (0.0019)




CRLow ∗ ∆sdown ∗ D/A 0.0320 0.0633
(0.0727) (0.0422)
∆s̄up,down ∗ D/A −0.5712∗∗∗ −0.6866∗∗∗ −0.4238∗∗∗ −0.4993∗∗∗
(0.0663) (0.0561) (0.0498) (0.0298)
∆sup ∗ D/A −0.3922∗∗∗ −0.3254∗∗∗
(0.0735) (0.0477)
∆sdown ∗ D/A −0.1252 −0.0740
(0.0816) (0.0512)
D/(D + E) −0.0141 −0.0153 −0.0134 −0.0132
(0.0121) (0.0125) (0.0116) (0.0117)
EBITDA/A 0.1445∗∗∗ 0.1449∗∗∗ 0.1343∗∗∗ 0.1377∗∗∗
(0.0201) (0.0203) (0.0185) (0.0186)
ln(Sales) 0.0062∗∗∗ 0.0074∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0031∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Adj. R2 0.1209 0.1224 0.0797 0.1092 0.1111 0.0680
N 17 456 17 456 17 456 17 115 17 115 17 115
Table A.18: Regression results of high or low credit spread change multiplied with outstanding
debt test, with spread change under upgrade ∆sup, ∆sdown and average spread change
∆s̄up,down. Dependent variable: net debt issuance.
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively.
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Excluding Large Excluding Large Debt
Debt Offerings & Equity Offerings
BBB- and BB+ BBB to BB BBB- and BB+ BBB to BB
Intercept −0.0326∗∗∗ −0.0327∗∗∗ −0.0106∗∗∗ −0.0106∗∗∗
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0028) (0.0028)
∆s̄up,down ∗ D/A −0.3661∗∗∗ −0.3732∗∗∗ −0.3054∗∗∗ −0.3082∗∗∗
(0.0399) (0.0418) (0.0378) (0.0397)
CRIG/SG 0.0037
∗∗ 0.0035∗∗ 0.0002 0.0007
(0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0013)
D/(D + E) −0.0209∗∗ −0.0203∗∗ −0.0215∗∗ −0.0212∗∗
(0.0096) (0.0097) (0.0094) (0.0096)
EBITDA/A 0.1284∗∗∗ 0.1288∗∗∗ 0.1220∗∗∗ 0.1222∗∗∗
(0.0176) (0.0175) (0.0165) (0.0165)
ln(Sales) 0.0053∗∗∗ 0.0053∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Adj. R2 0.1117 0.1118 0.1119 0.1119
N 20 835 20 835 20 455 20 455
Table A.19: Regression results of credit spread change multiplied with outstanding debt and
investment-grade border test. Dependent variable: net debt issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Excluding Large Excluding Large Debt
Debt Offerings & Equity Offerings
Intercept −0.0247∗∗∗ −0.0044
(0.0039) (0.0029)










CRBBB Border −0.0000 −0.0026
(0.0018) (0.0016)
CRBB Border −0.0151∗∗∗ −0.0135∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0017)
CRB Border −0.0185∗∗∗ −0.0076∗
(0.0066) (0.0039)






Adj. R2 0.1158 0.1163
N 20 835 20 455
Table A.20: Regression results of credit spread change multiplied with outstanding debt and
macro-rating border test. Dependent variable: net debt issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Excluding Large Excluding Large Debt
Debt Offerings & Equity Offerings






















CRBBB Border 0.0004 −0.0016
(0.0017) (0.0015)
CRBB Border −0.0064∗∗ −0.0071∗∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0020)
CRB Border −0.0096 −0.0032
(0.0074) (0.0045)






Adj. R2 0.1192 0.1198
N 20 835 20 455
Table A.21: Regression results of credit spread change multiplied with outstanding debt and
macro-rating border test, controlling for macro-rating differences. Dependent variable: net debt
issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Excluding Large Debt Offerings Excluding Large Debt & Equity Offerings
1 2 3 4 5 6
Intercept −0.0556∗∗∗ −0.0551∗∗∗ 0.0206∗∗∗ −0.0300∗∗∗ −0.0290∗∗∗ 0.0214∗∗∗
(0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0017) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0012)
CRPOM −0.0060∗∗∗ −0.0097∗∗∗ −0.0044∗∗ −0.0071∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0018) (0.0017)
CRPOM ∗ P̄ V up,down 0.0047 0.0061 0.0018 0.0030
(0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0029) (0.0026)
CRPlus −0.0055∗∗ −0.0046∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0023)




CRMinus ∗ PVdown 0.0065 0.0036
(0.0046) (0.0032)
∆P̄ V up,down −0.0185∗∗∗ −0.0332∗∗∗ −0.0149∗∗∗ −0.0269∗∗∗





D/(D + E) −0.0361∗∗∗ −0.0361∗∗∗ −0.0316∗∗∗ −0.0318∗∗∗
(0.0120) (0.0119) (0.0111) (0.0110)
EBITDA/A 0.1394∗∗∗ 0.1408∗∗∗ 0.1303∗∗∗ 0.1314∗∗∗
(0.0308) (0.0312) (0.0289) (0.0292)
ln(Sales) 0.0082∗∗∗ 0.0080∗∗∗ 0.0052∗∗∗ 0.0050∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Adj. R2 0.1010 0.1016 0.0341 0.0979 0.0992 0.0361
N 16 272 16 272 16 272 15 979 15 979 15 979
Table A.22: Regression results of plus or minus rating change valuation test. Dependent variable:
net debt issuance. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Appendix B
Used Compustat Data Fields
Field New Item Name Old Compustat Number
Used in Basic Analysis:
S&P Domestic Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating SPLTICRM 280
Long-Term Book Debt DLTT 9
Long-Term Debt Issuance DLTIS 111
Long-Term Debt Reduction DLTR 114
Current Debt Change DLCCH 301
Stockholders’ Equity SEQ 216
Sale of Common and Preferred Stock SSTK 108
Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock PRSTKC 115
Total Assets AT 6
Used as Control Variables:
EBITDA OIBDP 13
Sales SALE 12
Used in Credit Score Computation:
Stock Price Close PRCC C 24
Outstanding Shares CSHO 25
Used in Implied Interest Rate Computation:
Total Interest Expense XINT 15
Used in Debt Term Structure Tests:
Long-Term Debt maturing in 1 Year DD1 44
Long-Term Debt maturing in 2 Years DD2 91
Long-Term Debt maturing in 3 Years DD3 92
Long-Term Debt maturing in 4 Years DD4 93
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